Competing Duties?  Securities Lawyers\u27 Liability After Central Bank by Maxey, Ann
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 64 Issue 5 Article 4 
1996 
Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers' Liability After Central Bank 
Ann Maxey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ann Maxey, Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers' Liability After Central Bank, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2185 
(1996). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers' Liability After Central Bank 
Cover Page Footnote 
© 1996. Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University; I thank Professors James D. Cox, Donald E. 
Lively, and Mr. George W. Bermant for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Their 
comments do not meet the participation test; responsibility for the Article is mine. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol64/iss5/4 
ARTICLE
COMPETING DUTIES? SECURITIES
LAWYERS' LIABILITY AFTER
CENTRAL BANK
Ann Maxey*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 2185
I. LAWYERS' LIABILITY BEFORE CENTRAL BANK ............ 2190
A. Overview of Aiding and Abetting .................... 2190
1. Primary and Secondary Liability ................. 2194
2. Scienter .......................................... 2196
B. Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting ............ 2198
1. Private Actions .................................. 2198
2. National Student Marketing ..................... 2202
I. PRImARY LIABILITY AFTER CENTRAL BANK.............. 2204
A. The Central Bank Decision ......................... 2204
B. Unresolved Issues .................................... 2209
C. Misrepresentations ................................... 2211
1. The Participation Issue .......................... 2212
2. A Duty of Inquiry ............................... 2218
D. Omissions ........................................... 2221
1. A Duty to Disclose? ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2222
2. The Search for Duty ............................. 2223
a. Federal Common Law ........................ 2224
b. State Law .................................... 2225
c. Rules of Professional Conduct ................ 2227
III. SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ........................... 2232
A . Rule 2(e) ............................................ 2233
B. The Remedies Act of 1990 ........................... 2234
C. The 1995 Reform Act ................................ 2236
CONCLUSION ................................................... 2237
INTRODUCTION
T HE role of lawyers is defined by an indefeasible tension attributa-
ble to the competing demands of their legalistic functions and the
society that law governs. Lawyers are licensed by society to perform
* © 1996. Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University;, I thank Profes-
sors James D. Cox, Donald E. Lively, and Mr. George W. Bermant for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Their comments do not meet the participa-
tion test; responsibility for the Article is mine.
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tasks that may include challenging the system that empowers them. In
serving their unique function, lawyers owe a primary obligation to
their clients, but they also assume responsibilities to the society that is
the source of their authority. Lawyers are required to sort out, as best
they can, what to do when circumstances produce tension and conflict
between those different respoirsibilities. Fortunately, those conflicts
often do not arise when lawyers represent their clients in a contro-
versy or transaction. Each lawyer can pursue his obligation of repre-
senting his client's interests without assuming responsibility for the
other side or looking out for the public's welfare. The public's wel-
fare, presumably, is best served when lawyers collectively advance
their clients' interests.
This primary obligation to the client is supported by the legal rules.
Traditionally, lawyers do not owe a legal duty to those with whom
they are not in privity.1 The rules of professional conduct forbid a
lawyer to assume responsibility for third parties or the public welfare
at the expense of his client.2 The standard rationale is that any duty
lawyers owe to a third party or the public could conflict with the duty
owed to their clients. The duty to the client is thought to represent the
higher good because it fosters the client's confidence in the lawyer,
thus allowing the lawyer to counsel the client to comply with the law.
Moreover, the lawyer must be allowed to vigorously defend his client
without fear that the government will sanction the lawyer for failing to
assume a duty to the public. The government's own lawyers represent
the public on the other side of that controversy. This adversary model
reduces, but does not necessarily eliminate, the tension that can arise
between the lawyer's duty to client and the lawyer's responsibilities to
society.
Securities lawyers are especially aware of this tension because they
represent clients outside the adversary model as well as within it. Se-
curities lawyers, like other lawyers, represent clients in transactions
where the other side is represented by lawyers. They also assist cli-
ents in interpreting and complying with regulatory requirements of
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission")
and state securities agencies. Securities lawyers may be required to
1. During the 1960s, tortfeasors began facing liability from parties with whom
they had not contracted. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 791-94 (1966). Lawyers, however, generally
survived the decline of the privity requirement. In limited circumstances, the lawyer
may be liable to third persons who are the identified intended beneficiary of the legal
services. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying
Illinois law to hold lawyer liable for negligent misrepresentation to third parties con-
cerning title of property); see also Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 846 (7th Cir.
1991) (limiting lawyer's liability to third parties for misrepresentations in reports to
persons whom the lawyer knew might rely).
2. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1983) [hereinafter Model
Rules].
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defend their clients against enforcement actions initiated by those reg-
ulatory agencies.
Securities lawyers frequently advise clients in selling securities to
investors who lack legal representation. In doing so, lawyers generally
have been able to rely on the traditional rules of primary duty to the
client without assuming duties to investors. These rules do not, how-
ever, negate potential liability to investors who are protected by the
fiduciary notions of the federal securities laws. Until recently, if a se-
curities lawyer knowingly assisted a client in violating securities laws,
the investors could also recover against the lawyer for aiding and abet-
ting the client's violation. Liability for aiding and abetting was im-
posed on lawyers without the need for courts to articulate what
independent duties, if any, lawyers owed to the protected third par-
ties. In protecting investors, courts avoided creating rules that would
compete with and erode the lawyer's strict duty of loyalty to the client.
The Supreme Court eliminated aiding and abetting actions in a 1994
decision, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank.3 That decision swept
away thirty years of federal common law by limiting the reach of pri-
vate remedies against lawyers and others who provide services in con-
nection with the offering of securities. The Court ruled that the
general antifraud provision of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, Sec-
tion 10(b),4 did not include a private right of action against those who
"aid and abet" the "manipulative or deceptive" conduct of a primary
violator of Section 10(b).5
Investors who suffer a loss because they relied on an issuer's mis-
leading disclosures can sue the issuer as a primary violator of SEC
Rule 10b-5.6 Before Central Bank, investors could also recover from
the issuer's lawyer and others who had aided and abetted the primary
violation by establishing that the aider and abettor had knowledge of
the violation and had knowingly provided substantial assistance to the
3. 114 S. CL 1439 (1994).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994). Section 10 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange... (b) To use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
5. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995). The reach of Rule 10b-5 has much broader
application than just those transactions involving an issuer's sale of securities. See
generally Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, 7-8 Securities Regulation 3485-3631 (3d ed.
1991). This Article, however, uses the paradigmatic transaction of an issuer selling its
securities because the securities lawyer usually plays an important role in managing
the project, assisting in drafting disclosure documents, and counseling the client.
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primary violator.7 Investors can now seek remedies only from those
found to have committed a "primary" violation of the rule.
The Central Bank decision did not resolve whether securities law-
yers will now be held liable under theories of primary liability. Aiding
and abetting theory in the implied private actions of Rule 10b-5
played a significant role in holding lawyers legally accountable in se-
curities transactions.' The federal securities laws do not specifically
refer to lawyers in providing investors with express remedies for mis-
conduct as they do for other securities professionals, such as account-
ants and underwriters.9 The implied action therefore provided the
most important remedy for investors to hold a lawyer liable for dam-
ages when the lawyer acting qua lawyer participated in a fraudulent
securities transaction.
The SEC, relying on aiding and abetting actions, has been responsi-
ble for bringing some of the most significant actions against lawyers.
Central Bank's rationale left in doubt whether the SEC would be able
to continue to bring aiding and abetting actions. 10 Eighteen months
after the Central Bank decision, Congress enacted the Private Securi-
7. Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities
Fraud;- A Critical Examination, 52 Alb. L. Rev. 637, 661-68 (1988) (describing major-
ity version and other versions of the elements of the action). While courts formulated
different standards for aiding and abetting, all 11 federal circuits had recognized aid-
ing and abetting actions. See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). The Supreme Court had twice reserved ruling on the issue of whether § 10(b)
included a cause of action based on aiding and abetting. Herman & MacLean v. Hud-
dleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-
92 n.7 (1976).
8. The deterrence effect of liability is not an effective incentive to promote secur-
ities lawyers' careful conduct as are their own economic interests. Securities lawyers
are repeat players in the securities markets. They must not only protect against
reputational loss in representing their clients before regulatory agencies but also must
foster confidence and respect among the participants in the securities industry with
whom they deal.
While the deterrent effect of the risk of liability is not capable of measure, evidence
suggests that the risk is substantial enough to act as an entry barrier to practicing
securities law. Legal malpractice insurance premiums in securities law practice are
significantly higher than for other kinds of practice. Insurance is often unattainable
for lawyers deemed under-qualified. Without the possibility of Rule 10b-5 law suits,
insurance rates should eventually drop and more nonqualified lawyers would take up
the practice of securities law.
Positive economic interests and deterrence provided by liability rules should pro-
mote careful lawyer behavior. Unfortunately, there seems never to be a shortage of
plausible actions for securities lawyers' misconduct.
9. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994) ("1933 Act"). A law-
yer, however, can be held liable for his legal opinion under § 11 if he could not prove
the due diligence defenses provided in § 11. In practice, legal opinions required by
the securities laws in the public sale of securities are limited and the risk is not great.
10. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1460 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995,11 which restored to the SEC the
ability to enjoin lawyers (and others) who knowingly aid and abet a
primary violation.' 2 The 1995 Reform Act did not restore private ac-
tions for aiding and abetting.13
Prior to Central Bank, lawyers were held liable under aiding and
abetting theory without the plaintiff establishing that the investor re-
lied on the lawyer's conduct. In a case in which the investor was
deceived by misrepresentations, the investor needed only to show that
he relied on the misrepresentations made by the issuer to establish a
primary violation. The investor also had to prove that each of the
defendants acted with scienter.14 As to whether the lawyer aided and
abetted that primary violation, the court's inquiry focused primarily
on the lawyer's state of the mind. Courts inquired as to whether the
lawyer knowingly assisted in the misrepresentations. Establishing that
the lawyer provided substantial assistance was not usually a problem
because in most instances he was engaged to provide, and did provide,
substantial assistance. When the investor was deceived primarily
through the failure to disclose information, the investor would have to
show that the issuer owed the investor a duty to disclose the omitted
information. Once the breach of duty was shown, the collateral par-
ticipants, including the lawyer, could be held liable for aiding and
abetting that breach of duty.
The key point is that the aiding and abetting action bypassed in-
quiry into whether the lawyer owed a duty to the investor. Liability
based on aiding and abetting permitted courts to avoid determining
what duties lawyers owed to third parties in securities transactions.
The securities industry matured and the role of securities lawyers
evolved for six decades without development of rules or standards
governing the securities lawyers' responsibilities to investors.
Indeed, the aiding and abetting concept served as an implicit com-
promise between the organized bar and the courts in the regulation of
lawyers' professional conduct. In that compromise, the bar retained
its prerogative to define professional responsibility, including the law-
yers' responsibility to third parties. The courts retained their power to
hold lawyers liable for misconduct that harmed investors without hav-
ing to define lawyers' duties of professional responsibility.
Central Bank has altered that compromise. Private actions against
lawyers under Rule 10b-5 must now establish a basis for primary lia-
bility. This structure presumes that the investor is entitled to rely on
11. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-67, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter 1995 Reform Act].
12. Id. § 104, at 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 78t).
13. Id.
14. Scienter, as it applies to a cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, refers
to a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976); see infra part I.A.2.
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the lawyer's conduct because the lawyer either sufficiently partici-
pated in the drafting of the misrepresentations, or the lawyer owed a
duty to the investor to disclose the material omissions.
This Article examines theories courts can use to hold lawyers liable
as primary violators. Part I explores the development of lawyer liabil-
ity based on aiding and abetting. Part II considers the issues left un-
resolved by the Central Bank decision and explores the theories under
which the lawyer acting qua lawyer may be held liable for misrepre-
sentations and omissions. Finally, part III focuses on the effect of the
1995 Reform Act on SEC enforcement actions against lawyers.
Despite newly imposed impediments to suing securities lawyers, this
Article argues that the Central Bank decision should not lull lawyers
into complacency or a false sense of security. Lawyers will be held
responsible for their clients' misrepresentations. Moreover, if lawyers
are unwilling or unable to address their responsibilities to investors,
the courts will, by default, develop the disclosure duties lawyers owe
to the investing public.
I. LAWYERS' LIABILITY BEFORE CENTRAL BANK
A. Overview of Aiding and Abetting
The private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 has developed like all
common law-in fits and starts, uneven and messy, taking time to coa-
lesce into a workable, never neat, theory. 15 To establish a primary
15. The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1942 pursuant to Congress's 1934 grant of
statutory authority under § 10(b) to prescribe rules to prohibit any person to use or
employ any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994); see supra note 4. Rule 10b-5 is the chief en-
forcement mechanism for § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78kk (1994) [hereinafter "Exchange Act"]. The substance of Rule 10b-5 was
taken from § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, substituting the words "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" for the words "in the sale of any securities." The
drafters of Rule 10b-5 intended this substitution to define the scope of the rule as a
supplement to the SEC's enforcement capacity under § 17(a) by extending protection
to sellers as well as to purchasers. Milton Freeman, Remarks, Conference on Codifica-
tion of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 921-23 (1967).
Four years after the SEC implemented Rule 10(b)-5, a federal court, relying on tort
principles, implied a private remedy for those investors injured by violators of the
rule. Congress did not provide investors with an express remedy against those who
violated the "catchall" securities fraud provisions of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (describing Section 10(b) as a "catch all"
securities fraud provision). The cause of action itself and its scope were court created.
The first case to imply a private remedy for a violation of Rule 10b-5 was Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). For 50 years, federal courts
have permitted private actions against those persons who deceived investors in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Regardless of what Congress may have originally intended by § 10(b), the courts,
over 30 years of litigation, expanded the SEC rule to apply to conduct deemed to be
unfair or illegal in financial transactions. The courts, with the SEC's encouragement,
generally proved sympathetic to plaintiffs' securities fraud claims. See Steve Thel, The
Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev.
2190 [Vol. 64
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violation of Rule 10b-5,16 a plaintiff must prove the defendant, acting
with scienter, made a misrepresentation of material fact on which the
385 (1990) (arguing that Congress intended Section 10(b) to confer expansive SEC
regulatory powers instead of the restrictive view adopted by recent cases). Flagrant
fraud occurs with sufficient regularity to keep courts sensitive to the need to redress
the wrongs and to adapt the rule to punish wrongdoers. See Donald C. Langevoort,
Rule 10(b)-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 Fordham L Rev. S7 (1993).
Beginning in 1975, the Supreme Court, in a series of cases, began to trim the reach
of the private remedy. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), the Supreme Court, expressing for the first time the majority of the Court's
growing concern with the need to limit "vexatious litigation," held that standing in
private actions was limited to purchasers or sellers of securities, Id. at 733. That case
was followed the next year by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976),
where the Court found that an accounting firm could not be held liable in an aiding
and abetting action for merely negligent conduct, and that a plaintiff must plead and
prove that a defendant acted with scienter. Id at 213-15. In 1977, Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), established that defendants' unfair conduct alone
would not state a claim; rather, the unfairness must be accompanied by deceitful con-
duct. Id. at 474.
As the Supreme Court restricted Rule 10b-5's reach, especially with the require-
ment that plaintiffs plead and prove scienter, plaintiffs turned, with success, to § 12 of
the 1933 Act. Section 12 provides an express private remedy against "sellers" of un-
registered securities and does not require proof of scienter. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994).
The lower courts were receptive to a broad definition of "seller" that included those
who participated in the sale, including lawyers.
The Supreme Court, in its 1988 decision in Pinter v. Dahli, 486 U.S. 622 (1988),
restricted the definition of "seller" to a person who successfully solicits the purchase,
motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of
the securities owner. ld. at 641-55. This definition has made it difficult to hold lawyers
liable as "sellers" of securities as long as the lawyer stays within his counseling role
and does not have direct contact with the buyers of the securities.
The Court also cut off claims against collateral participants in RICO cases. In
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993), the Court interpreted the statutory
text to hold that "[Section] 1962(c) cannot be interpreted to reach complete 'outsid-
ers' because liability depends on showing that the defendants [in this case, independ-
ent accountants] conducted or participated in the conduct of the 'enterprise's affairs,'
not just their own affairs." ld. at 1173. The 1995 Reform Act, however, eliminated
RICO civil actions where the defendants' predicate offense was conduct "that would
have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities." 1995 Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 758 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c)(1995)). Thus, the RICO laws do not apply to defendants who are
not criminally convicted of securities fraud.
In 1995, the Court further restricted the reach of the securities laws in holding that
§ 12(2) of the 1933 Act (imposing liability on sellers who make oral or written misrep-
resentations unless the sellers can prove they were not negligent) applied only to pub-
lic offerings. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (1995). Therefore,
investors in private offerings and secondary market transactions no longer have this
express remedy available.
Even though the Supreme Court has, since 1975, generally sought to restrict the
reach of the federal securities remedies, the lower courts have continued to be recep-
tive to new arguments offered by plaintiffs to hold collateral participants liable in
fraudulent securities transactions.
16. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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plaintiff relied, and the misrepresentation caused 7 the plaintiff's
harm. A defendant who fails to disclose material facts can also be
held liable if the plaintiff can establish that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty to speak. Added to the concepts of scienter, material-
ity, reliance, and causation, are the requirements that the misrepre-
sentation or omission be made "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."' 8 The plaintiff must have either purchased or
sold the security to have standing to bring the action. Privity is not
required.' 9
Before Central Bank, liability was also imposed on collateral par-
ticipants who aided or abetted a primary violation. Ignoring the in-
tejurisdictional and intertemporal variations, the plaintiff could
generally recover from a collateral participant if he could prove: (1)
the existence of a primary violation; (2) the collateral participant's
knowledge or recklessness as to the primary violation; and (3) the sub-
stantial assistance provided by the participant to the primary
violator.2 °
The concept of aiding and abetting a securities violation was de-
rived from civil common law and criminal law doctrine. Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,21 the first private remedies
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
17. The Fifth Circuit distinguishes between transaction causation and loss causa-
tion. The plaintiff must prove "transaction causation," i.e., the plaintiff would not
have purchased the security or would not have purchased the security at the same
price if he had known the truth of the matters that were misrepresented. Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 n.24 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 459 U.S. 375, 391 (1983). The plaintiff must also prove "loss causation," i.e.,
the matters misrepresented caused the security to loose its value. Id. at 549. If the
security lost value, for instance, through a general decline in the stock market, rather
than from the market's repricing of the security due to the revelation of the misrepre-
sentation, "loss causation" would not be established. Id. The Supreme Court has not
used those terms. In holding that reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of
action, the Court stated: "[R]eliance provides the requisite causal connection be-
tween a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury." Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). However, some courts make a distinction between
"transaction causation" and "loss causation." The 1995 Reform Act now requires a
plaintiff in a private action to prove loss causation. 1995 Reform Act, Pub. Law No.
104-67, § 105, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737, 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(3)(b)).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
19. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 382.
20. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
non Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994).
21. 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); see also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259
2192 [Vol. 64
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case to recognize aiding and abetting, adopted the term from two ear-
lier SEC injunction actions.2 In giving content to aiding and abetting
theory in a private civil action, Brennan relied on Section 876 of the
Restatement of Torts, which provides that a person is responsible for
harm resulting to a third party if the person, knowing of the wrong,
gives substantial assistance to the wrongdoer. 3 Section 876 does not
mention the words "aiding and abetting" or any concept of primary
and secondary liability.' At common law, the joint tortfeasors-the
wrongdoer who has direct contact with the plaintiff and those persons
who assist the wrongdoer in accomplishing the wrong-are equally
liable.'
Brennan gave rise to joint tort liability for participation in fraudu-
lent schemes even though the participants were not acting in con-
F. Supp 673, 675 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (complaint stated a claim for aiding and abetting).
In Brennan, the defendant corporation, Midwestern, was held liable under Rule 10b-5
for aiding and abetting the fraudulent scheme of a securities broker, Dobich, who was
trading Midwestern's stock, keeping the sales proceeds for himself, and not transfer-
ring the stock to the buyers. Brennan, 417 F.2d at 148. Midwestern, which acted as its
own transfer agent, received complaints from the purchasers. Brennan, 286 F. Supp. at
726. Each time a purchaser complained to Midwestern, its officials would refer the
complaint to Dobich, who covered his tracks by sending stock to the complainant. hla
Midwestern received complaints over a long period of time, had conversations with
Dobich about the problem, and apparently the Midwestern officers decided not to
report Dobich to state securities regulators during merger negotiations because dis-
covery of the scheme might have depressed Midwestern's stock price. Id. at 727.
The district court, after detailing the convoluted actions of both Dobich and Mid-
western's officers, held that Midwestem had a duty to report the broker's activities to
the state securities commission. Id. at 728. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the case, not
on a theory that Midwestern had a duty to disclose Dobich's conduct to the state, but
because Midwestern gave active and knowing assistance to the primary violator.
Brennan, 417 F.2d at 155.
22. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 676; see also SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp.
904, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that defendant "participated in the distribution"
within the meaning of Rule 10(b)-6); SEC v. Thnetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34,43 (N.D.
Ca. 1939) (applying aiding and abetting principles to the 1933 Act), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944). Aiding and abetting a
10b-5 violation for SEC enforcement actions preceded by seven years the recognition
of a private civil remedy for 10b-5. Those decisions simply accepted the proposition
that because the securities laws permitted a criminal action for aiding and abetting,
the SEC was surely entitled to obtain injunctive relief to prohibit the proscribed con-
duct The courts were aware that the text of Section 10 did not include the words "aid
and abet." The SEC, as a matter of administrative convenience, used the terms in
pleading both civil and criminal cases, sometimes lumping defendants together indis-
criminately. One can imagine that the terminology had an appropriate n terrorem
effect in rounding up the suspects.
23. "For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he... (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself . . ." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1977) [hereinafter
Restatement (Second)]; see also Brennan, 286 F. Supp. at 708.
24. Restatement (Second), supra note 23, § 876.
25. Id. (Comment on Clause (b)) ("If the encouragement or assistance is a sub-
stantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and
is responsible for the consequences of the other's act.").
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cert.26 The actions of each actor in these multiple party transactions
may be different but all actors who were liable for the tort were "pri-
mary" in the sense that they were considered to be engaged in con-
duct to bring about the same results and they were liable in the same
degree.2 7 Liability for aiding and abetting premised on tort law con-
cepts did not require two separate causes of action under Rule 10b-
5. The bifurcation of joint tortfeasors into primary and secondary
actors and the development of primary and secondary liability in Rule
10b-5 actions arose only after Professor David Ruder, in 1972, pub-
lished an influential law review article. 9
1. Primary and Secondary Liability
In his article on multiple defendants in securities fraud cases, Pro-
fessor Ruder argued a fundamental distinction between "primary"
and "secondary" levels of misconduct:
In most multiple defendant securities law suits some of the defend-
ants will be primarily engaged in the wrongdoing, while others will
be engaged only in a secondary fashion. This distinction between
primary and secondary wrongdoers provides a method for deter-
mining liability and for allocating rights among wrongdoers. For
purposes of this Article, persons owing direct duties to the public
will be classified as primary wrongdoers. Those whose liabilities
arise only because another has violated the law will be called secon-
dary wrongdoers. In most cases those who are only secondarily lia-
ble will be less culpable than those who are primarily liable.3U
26. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 708, 725-27
(N.D. Ind. 1968) (finding that defendants were liable because even if the losses would
have occurred without their conduct, they still aided and abetted the conduct), aff'd,
417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 998 (1970).
27. There was no concept that one actor was the "primary" tortfeasor, connoting a
higher degree of fault, and that another actor was "secondarily" liable, connoting a
lesser degree of fault. The common law theories of so called "secondary" liability-
the agency theory of respondeat superior; the criminal law theories of conspiracy and
aiding and abetting, or their civil law equivalents-do not distinguish relative degrees
of culpability.
The common law theories of multiple defendants' liability in the actions of conspir-
ing with, or aiding and abetting the wrongdoer who has contact with the plaintiff, are
concerned with establishing the parameters of proximate or legal cause. Once that
outside parameter is established, all those falling inside it are bound together in the
same degree of fault. The actors are bound together because they in some way throw
in their lot with each other to make the wrongdoing succeed. Because there is more
than one actor, the conduct is more likely to succeed, thus creating the potential for
more certain and greater harm.
28. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
29. David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding
and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 597 (1972). Professor Ruder marshaled 34 cases on either conspiracy or
aiding and abetting he had found from 1944 through 1971. Id. at 625, nn.123-24. A
review of those cases demonstrates that none of those decisions refers to or uses a
concept of "primary" and "secondary" liability among the tortfeasors.
30. Iat at 600.
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Professor Ruder stated that the "primary" wrongdoer "violates the
law" because he owes a duty to the public, while the "secondary"
wrongdoer's conduct does not in itself violate the securities law.31
When applied to the "secondary liability" of aiding and abetting, Pro-
fessor Ruder's classification scheme requires two additional assump-
tions: (1) the aider and abettor's own culpable conduct in assisting in
the fraud is not, without something more, deceptive conduct that vio-
lates the law, and/or (2) the aider and abettor does not owe either a
derived duty32 or an independent duty to investors to refuse to aid and
abet another's breach of duty.33 These distinctions between primary
violators and aiders and abettors are difficult to justify under common
law ideas of holding joint tortfeasors liable as a group, especially when
each member of the group is acting with scienter. The 1995 Reform
Act resurrected SEC aiding and abetting actions, and abolished this
arbitrary distinction between primary and secondary liability.34 It
provides that the aider and abettor is deemed to be in violation of the
securities laws to the same extent as the principal.as
The differing degrees of culpability between primary and secondary
wrongdoing encouraged the courts to describe two causes of actions:
one for the primary wrongdoer who was deemed more culpable, and
another for the supposedly less culpable, aider and abettor. The
Courts were not required to be careful in distinguishing the conduct
that constituted each cause of action because liability for the actions
was joint and several.36 Eventually, the Supreme Court in Central
Bank would conveniently dispose of aiding and abetting conduct by
assuming (as had other courts) that aiding and abetting was a separate
31. See id. at 645-46.
32. An aider and abettor could be held to owe a derived duty analogous to a
primary tippee in an insider trading violation. The tipper of inside information in
breach of his fiduciary duty discloses to the primary tippee, who knows of the breach
and who does not herself trade, but tips the information to a trader. The primary
tippee in this situation is liable because she has assumed a duty derived from the
original insider.
33. See Ruder, supra note 29, at 645-46.
34. 1995 Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.),
737, 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t).
35. Id. Federal criminal law does not attempt to justify the distinction between
primary and secondary actors. It treats both the primary actor and the aider and
abettor as principals. The federal criminal statute dealing with aiding and abetting, 18
U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994), applies to all federal criminal statutes. Aiding and abetting
under that statute is not an independent crime; the statute simply abolishes the dis-
tinction between common law ideas of principal and accessory. United States v. Keg-
ler, 724 F.2d 190, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The elements of the substantive crimes
provide the definition of the conduct that is prohibited. U.S. v. Campbell, 426 F.2d
547, 553 (2d Cir. 1970).
36. See, e.g., Moore v. Fenex, Inc. 809 F.2d 297, 304-05 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1006 (1987). In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), the
Supreme Court noted, without comment, that the trial court had found dual liability.
Ild. at 379 n.5.
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cause of action and that the conduct was not deceptive conduct within
the meaning of the statutory language of Section 10(b).37
2. Scienter
Although courts have blurred the distinctions between the primary
and secondary actors' conduct, they have consistently focused on the
actors' mental states with which they acted. In the expansive era of
10b-5 litigation,38 the courts split on whether negligence or some de-
gree of scienter was the appropriate standard for a private action
under Rule 10b-5.39 The Supreme Court's first examination of aiding
and abetting under Rule 10b-5 was in a case involving accountants
who negligently failed to detect their client's fraud.40 While expressly
reserving the issue of whether aiding and abetting was actionable
under Section 10(b), the Court held that scienter-"a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" 41 -was a re-
quired element for all private actions. 2 The Court did not reach the
issue of whether reckless behavior was sufficient to meet the scienter
standard.43 The majority of the circuits since Ernst & Ernst have
adopted a recklessness standard for primary violations." The most
often quoted definition of recklessness is one adopted by the Seventh
Circuit:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omis-
sion, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence,
but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have
been aware of it. 4 5
37. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994) ("We can-
not amend the statute to create liability for [aiding and abetting] acts that are not
themselves manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the statute.").
38. Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 963, 985-98 (1994)
(describing three eras of Rule 10b-5 litigation).
39. See Ruder, supra note 29, at 620-21.
40. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
41. Id. at 193-94 n.12.
42. Id. at 212-14.
43. Id. at 191-92 n.7.
44. See First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 901 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. on other grounds, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994);
see also Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 n.6 (citing cases from
the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Cir-
cuits, and citing to opinions of district courts in the Fourth Circuit); 8 Loss & Selig-
man, supra note 6, at 3665-66 (marshaling cases from all the circuits).
45. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977)
(quoting Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okl.
1976)); see, e.g., In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1995) (adopt-
ing definition of recklessness identical to Sundstrand).
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Courts did not uniformly adopt a recklessness standard for aiding and
abetting liability.4 Some courts applied a recklessness standard to all
10b-5 claims without distinguishing between primary and aiding and
abetting liability.47 Other courts explicitly applied a recklessness stan-
dard to aiding and abetting claims. Some courts, however, in decid-
ing nondisclosure cases, distinguished between aiders and abettors
who owed a duty to plaintiffs and those who did not. A recklessness
standard applied to aiders and abettors who remained silent when
they owed a duty to speak to the plaintiff. In the absence of a duty to
disclose, those courts held that the aider and abettor would be held
liable only if he intended to assist the primary violation.49 In First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring ("Central Bank"),50 the Tenth
Circuit had ruled that the defendant bank could be held liable for
reckless conduct even though the court concluded that the bank did
not owe a disclosure duty to the bond holders.5 The issue appealed
to the Supreme Court in Central Bank was whether proof of reckless
behavior was sufficient to trigger aiding and abetting liability when the
aider and abettor did not owe any duty to the plaintiff.5 The Court
itself decided to address the issue of whether Section 10(b) authorized
an action for aiding and abetting.53
The recklessness standard for primary violators continues to be
valid. The 1995 Reform Act does not alter the degree of scienter nec-
essary to prove a primary violation in a private action.- The Reform
Act's approach is to allocate damages based upon which defendants
are found to have knowingly violated the securities laws. 5 Those who
46. See generally Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule 10(b)-
5: The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1087, 1103-04
(1984) (stating that in aiding and abetting liability, some courts have adopted the gen-
eral recklessness standard while other courts use the recklessness standard only if the
aider and abetter owes a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff). Some courts held that absent
a duty to disclose, there is no aiding and abetting liability for silence or inaction.
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,495-96 (7th Cir. 1986).
47. C.E. Carlson, Inc. v. SEC, 859 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th Cir. 1988).
48. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991).
49. See Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624-25 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1057 (1985).
50. 969 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
51. First Interstate Bank, 969 F.2d at 902-03.
52. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1444.
53. In holding that aiding and abetting did not exist, the Court did not address the
"recklessness" issue. Subsequently, circuit courts have affirmed recklessness as be-
havior that meets the scienter requirement. See In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50
F.3d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting the formulation that has been adopted by the
Ninth Circuit); Shields v. Citytrust Bankcorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (2d Cir.
1994).
54. See 1995 Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.)
737, 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t).
55. I; see infra note 196 and accompanying text.
19961 2197
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
knowingly violate the laws are to be held jointly and severally liable,
while all other defendants found liable must pay only their propor-
tionate share of damages. 56 The statute's definition of "knowingly"
specifically excludes reckless conduct.57
The 1995 Reform Act cuts both ways for the lawyer acting qua law-
yer in a fraudulent securities transaction. Courts may find it easier to
hold that plaintiffs have stated a claim against a lawyer for reckless
conduct, especially when they are aware that the lawyer's liability ex-
posure for the reckless conduct is limited to his proportionate share of
the responsibility. On the other hand, the statute imposes strict plead-
ing requirements that the complaint "state with particularity facts giv-
ing rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind, ' 58 which should help lawyers from being
named in suits without adequate grounds.
B. Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting
1. Private Actions
Lawyers who actively participate in fraud or act as principals of an
issuer engaged in misconduct will be held liable for securities laws vio-
lations.59 This Article is concerned, however, with issues arising when
lawyers act qua lawyer in connection with securities transactions. The
distinctions between the lawyer with actual knowledge participating in
fraud and the lawyer acting qua lawyer in counseling his client with
56. 1995 Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 201, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.)
737, 758-59 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4).
57. For purpose of the proportionate liability provision only, "knowingly" is de-
fined as "actual knowledge" that the representation is false, or omits to state a fact
necessary in order to make the statement made not misleading [or] with actual knowl-
edge that, as a result of the omission, one of the material representations... is false."
Id. § 201, at 761 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(10)(A)(i)(I)) (emphasis added).
The 1995 Reform Act does not define knowingly for purposes of the SEC's author-
ity to bring civil aiding and abetting actions against "any person that knowingly pro-
vides substantial assistance" to one who violates the securities laws. Id. § 104, at 757
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)(2)(f)). The term knowingly could include reckless con-
duct, see 10 Loss & Seligman, supra note 6, at 4690-93, but the issue is ripe for
litigation.
58. 1995 Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.)
737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)).
59. See, e.g., Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., 855 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1988) (lawyer
who was also director, secretary, and shareholder liable to shareholders for misrepre-
sentations); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding
liable a lawyer who knowingly prepared fraudulent documents and procured the serv-
ices of others to assist in selling unregistered securities to public); United States v.
Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding lawyer who personally sold
shares of unregistered stock and issued opinion letters that allowed millions of shares
to be sold to the public primarily liable); Pucci v. Santi, 711 F. Supp. 916, 925-26 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (holding that lawyer was the primary participant when he also acted as of-
ficer, director, shareholder, and general partner of limited partnership); Felts v. Na-
tional Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (holding lawyer who
was also president of issuer liable as principal).
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respect to the securities laws is crucial for an understanding of these
issues. The factual distinctions important for these purposes are the
kind of conduct at issue and the mental state in which the lawyer acts.
Rule 10b-5 prohibits the making of material misrepresentations or
omissions.60 This broad rule prohibits conduct ranging from failing to
disclose that the issuer's president intends to use the investor's money
for his peccadillos (fraud) to a company denying rumors that merger
talks are underway in order to protect the shareholders from having
the deal fall through (a material misrepresentation). The lawyer act-
ing qua lawyer who learns of the president's fraudulent scheme has no
hesitation in withdrawing. If he fails to withdraw, he will be given
little sympathy. Because he knows of the fraud, he will have demon-
strated the requisite scienter and he will no longer be acting qua law-
yer. As a lawyer he must withdraw, but whether he can disclose the
client's secret to prevent the harm will depend upon the jurisdiction in
which he is licensed to practice law. Does he have a duty of inquiry to
discover the scheme? Does he have a duty to disclose the scheme to
the investors? If so, how does he fulfill that duty? In deciding ex ante
what action to take, he will also be aware that his former client may be
able to sue him for breaching his professional responsibility in failing
to keep the confidence.6'
In the merger example, does the lawyer who is representing the
company in the merger negotiations withdraw as soon as she hears the
company's spokesperson on CNN denying the merger talks? She will
most likely know that the denial constitutes a material misrepresenta-
tion. What if the client had discussed the issue with the lawyer and
she had advised that the denial would be a securities law violation?
Does her continued representation make her a knowing participant in
a securities law violation? What if the lawyer had advised the client
that the denial would not constitute a violation? Would the lawyer
have acted negligently in giving the wrong advice or was the mistake
so obvious that she must have been reckless in giving that advice?
Does the lawyer have a duty to appear on. CNN to correct the material
misrepresentation to prevent harm to those shareholders who will sell
their shares at a loss before the merger? Does she have a duty to the
remaining shareholders not to reveal the merger talks which revela-
tion may kill the transaction? As reality would have it, most situations
will not be as clear as the hypotheticals. They will include hazy facts
and uncertain law that frequently will call for the lawyer to exercise
judgment that may later prove to be wrong. Sometimes, his profes-
sional action or inaction may be egregious enough to be deemed
reckless.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
61. Model Rules, supra note 2, Rule 1.6(a).
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Even though violations of RulelOb-5 are frequently referred to as
fraud, the term "fraud" used in this context is overbroad. This does
not mean that injured investors should not recover for securities viola-
tions or that violations should not be deterred through civil actions.
The nature of the violation, however, has important implications for
the kind of lawyer decision-making and conduct that should be en-
couraged or deterred.
Several different factual scenarios predominate in securities lawyers
liability cases. One genre of cases concerns lawyer liability in issuing
legal opinions, e.g., the difficult legal opinion cases occur when a law-
yer issues an erroneous legal opinion based on misrepresentations of
material facts supplied by a client. Lawyers' tax opinions used in sell-
ing tax shelters or tax exempt bonds are the subjects of most of these
cases. Before Central Bank, lawyers' liability for materially mislead-
ing opinion letters was sometimes dealt with as aiding and abetting
and sometimes as a primary violation.62
Liability issues also arise in the setting of lawyers assisting their cli-
ents in drafting disclosure documents that are later shown to contain
materially misleading statements. Some courts have held that the law-
yer's liability in this situation is limited to aiding and abetting the cli-
ent's misrepresentations. 63 Other courts, including two pre-Central
Bank cases, have held that lawyers committed primary violations in
drafting issuers' documents.64
62. See Kline v. First Western Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994) (impos-
ing, in a post-Central Bank case, primary liability on lawyer); see also Ackerman v.
Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 845-49 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that misleading opinion letter
was basis for lawyer liability without distinguishing primary or aiding and abetting
liability); Gilmore v. Berg, 761 F. Supp. 358, 373 (D.N.J. 1991) (denying summary
judgment to lawyer in an action for aiding and abetting issuing of tax opinion without
experience or expertise and without investigation); Stevens v. Equidyne Extractive
Indus. 1980, 694 F. Supp. 1057, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating aiding and abetting
claim against lawyer for tax opinion letter).
63. See Kilmartin v. H. C. Wainwright & Co., 580 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Mass.
1984) (stating that lawyers are liable for aiding and abetting when they knowingly
prepare misleading documents).
64. In Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991), a
1983 merger with a defunct public shell corporation was followed by the merged com-
pany making a private placement of convertible debentures. Within a year, the com-
pany was bankrupt. The lawyer who represented the parties in the merger transaction
reviewed and made changes in the offering document prepared by a second lawyer
(who was not a party to the suit). Id. at 913. The Sixth Circuit held, without explana-
tion, that the lawyer who made the changes in the offering document had a "direct"
duty to investors to make full and accurate disclosure about matters within his knowl-
edge gained in the merger transaction. AL at 917-18. The lawyer was also liable under
Michigan law for negligent misrepresentation (which required the defendant to act
with scienter) to foreseeable users of the information. Id. at 915-16.
In Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991), Berg, one of the
principals of the issuer, had absconded with the investors money. Id. at 143. The court
ruled that plaintiffs stated a valid claim against the lawyer for preparing the limited
partnership real estate private placement memorandum that did not disclose that
Berg had been convicted of fraud in connection with a prior limited partnership offer-
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The factual setting in which the lawyer is farthest removed from
contact with third parties is when the lawyer is counseling and advis-
ing his client with respect to a securities transaction. During the
course of representation, the lawyer becomes aware that his client is
misrepresenting or withholding material information or is engaged in
other behavior that violates the securities laws. The issue in this set-
ting is whether the lawyer has a duty to disclose the violation. The
National Student Marketing case of the early 1970s, discussed below,
presented an opportunity to explore this issue, although the court
largely bypassed it. 5
These factual settings present the conundrum of the securities law-
yer-a duty of loyalty to represent his client and to keep his client's
confidences, and a competing duty, if any, to prevent harm to inno-
cent third parties. Under the current Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules"), the lawyer's only choice upon discovering
client fraud is to withdraw from the representation." He must, how-
ever, continue to hold his wrongdoing client's confidences inviolate. 67
Courts have not articulated a duty for a lawyer to disclose to inves-
tors in situations in which the lawyer counsels the client but does not
participate in the drafting of misrepresentations. Courts, in imposing
liability on lawyers for conduct that is essentially a failure to disclose,
relied on an aiding and abetting theory. They thus avoided the neces-
sity to define what duties of disclosure, if any, lawyers owed to
investors.
When finding that a lawyer did not commit a violation, or aid and
abet a violation, courts have tended to rely on the rule that lawyers do
ing. Id. at 144-45. The lawyer had prepared a supplemental memorandum which par-
tiaily disclosed Berg's conviction, but had concluded that the information was not
"material." Id. at 144. The lawyer considered that the information was not material
because the transaction had been structured so that Berg could not get his hands on
the money. The court found that the lawyer had a duty to disclose accurately and was
at least reckless in failing to investigate the nature of Berg's conviction prior to the
lawyer's "opinion" set forth in the memorandum. Id. The disclosure document was
not only attributed to the lawyer, but it was also deemed his opinion with respect to
whether the disclosure of the conviction was material.
65. See infra part I.B.2.
66. Model Rules, supra note 2, Rule 1.16(b). This was not always the lawyer's
only choice. See infra part H.D.2.c.
67. See Model Rules, supra note 2, Rule 1.6(b). Rule 1.6(b) provides:
A lawyer may reveal such [confidential] information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary-
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a crim-
inal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any pro-
ceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
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not owe duties to third parties. In recent years, several courts have
been especially outspoken in holding that lawyers do not assume du-
ties to nonclients.68 In each of those cases, however, the facts were
atypical of the usual model in which the securities lawyer plays a pri-
mary role in the issuance of securities to investors. When those courts
concluded that the lawyers were not liable to investors, they invoked
the general rule that a lawyer does not owe duties to nonclients. This
invocation of the general rule was a conclusion the courts reached af-
ter satisfying themselves that: (1) there was not sufficient evidence of
scienter; (2) the lawyer's participation in the transaction was not sig-
nificant; (3) the lawyer's role in the transaction was limited to not dis-
closing his client's confidences when the lawyer was not assisting in
drafting disclosure documents; or (4) some combination of the first
three.69 The duties securities lawyers owe to investors were, and still
are, confused: They owe duties except when they do not.
2. National Student Marketing
The SEC has attempted, with limited success, to impose general du-
ties of disclosure on securities lawyers. In 1972, the Commission
sought injunctive sanctions in SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp.70 against numerous defendants, including lawyers of two promi-
nent law firms, as a result of their representation of their respective
clients in a merger of National Student Marketing Corporation
("NSMC") and Interstate National Corporation ("INC"). At the clos-
68. See, e.g., Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 473-
75 (4th Cir. 1992) (lawyer providing tax opinion had no duty to ensure accuracy of
other information provided to investors); Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 461-62 (8th
Cir. 1991) (lawyer for buyer of corporation's stock was not liable to seller for failure
to disclose interest of subsequent buyer of stock); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485,
490-94 (4th Cir. 1991) (lawyer who had reason to know of client's true financial condi-
tion was not liable to seller of stock for providing seller with client's materially false
financial statements in connection with client buying all the stock of corporation);
Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1126-28 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing verdict
against underwriters' attorneys for failing to correct material misrepresentations in
issuer's disclosure statements); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797
F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986) (lawyer had no duty to investors to correct representa-
tions made after lawyer's firm had ceased representing client).
69. See Fortson, 961 F.2d at 473-75 (combination); Camp, 948 F.2d at 461-62 (in-
significant participation); Schatz, 943 F.2d at 490-94 (misrepresentations made by cli-
ents); Barker, 797 F.2d at 496-97 (scienter).
70. Complaint, SEC v. National Student Mktg Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972). National Student Marketing's law-
yers, White & Case, settled with the SEC by entering into a consent decree. Several
opinions in the course of the litigation were reported. See SEC v. National Student
Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp.,
73 F.R.D. 444 (D.D.C. 1977); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 639
(D.D.C. 1977); SEC v. National Student Mktg Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975);
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 68 F.R.D. 157 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d
404 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); SEC v. National Student Mktg
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
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ing of the merger, the NSMC accountant's comfort letter revealed the
need to materially restate revenues. This in turn made the proxy
statement's financial information materially misleading. That infor-
mation had been used to solicit INC shareholders' votes to approve
the merger. INC lawyers did not take sufficient action to persuade
their client to delay the merger until the shareholders could be resolic-
ited using the accurate information. The SEC argued that the lawyers
had a duty to disclose to the SEC, or the shareholders, their client's
refusal to resolicit the shareholders.7 1 In rejecting the SEC's views,
the court held that the lawyers aided and abetted the violation by fail-
ing "to take steps to ensure that the information would be disclosed to
the shareholders."'  The court thus sidestepped the issue of whether
the lawyer had a duty to disclose the fraud to someone other than the
lawyer's own client.
The court found that when a lawyer's client commits a violation
under these circumstances, the lawyer has a duty to both recognize
that violation, and to take sufficient steps to attempt to persuade the
client to disclose the matter or information to the shareholders."3 The
lawyer's breach of that duty was held to have aided and abetted the
client's violation.74
71. National Student Marketing, 457 F. Supp. at 700-01.
72. Id at 713. The court found that because the lawyers had taken no steps to
delay the closing, "it [was] unnecessary to determine the precise extent of their obli-
gations." Id.
73. Id. The court also stated that the lawyer had "fiduciary responsibilities to cli-
ent shareholders." Il at 714. The opinion, however, does not imply that the lawyer
himself must disclose to the shareholders.
74. Id. at 715. The court rejected an opportunity to begin determining the extent
of lawyers' duties of disclosure in this situation. In describing the lawyer's duty, the
court stated:
The major problem arising with regard to the Commission's contention that
the attorneys failed to interfere in the closing of the merger is whether inac-
tion or silence constitutes substantial assistance [for aiding and abetting lia-
bility]. While there is no definitive answer to this question, courts have been
willing to consider inaction as a form of substantial assistance when the ac-
cused aider and abettor had a duty to disclose. Although the duty to disclose
in those cases is somewhat distinguishable, in that they contemplate disclo-
sure to an opposing party and not to one's client, they are sufficiently analo-
gous to provide support for a duty here. Upon receipt of the unsigned
comfort letter, it became clear that the merger had been approved by the
Interstate shareholders on the basis of materially misleading information. In
view of the obvious materiality of the information, especially to attorneys
learned in securities law, the attorneys' responsibilities to their corporate
client required them to take steps to ensure that the information would be
disclosed to the shareholders. However, it is unnecessary to determine the
precise extent of their obligations here, since it is undisputed that they took
no steps whatsoever to delay the closing pending disclosure to and resolicita-
tion of the Interstate shareholders.. . .Their silence was not only a breach of
this duty to speak, but in addition lent the appearance of legitimacy to the
closing.
Id at 713 (citations omitted).
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National Student Marketing is remarkable more for the extraordi-
nary attention it received from the legal community than for the nar-
row ruling that concluded the proceedings in 1978. The case was
deemed to have represented "a substantial departure from traditional
standards of care and priorities of duties for securities lawyers."'75 The
legal community was concerned not only that the courts might agree
with the SEC that lawyers should be required to "blow the whistle" on
their clients, but that the SEC was attempting to regulate the profes-
sional responsibility of lawyers.76
In addition to bringing the National Student Marketing case, the
SEC, in the early 1980s, used its administrative proceedings to bring
aiding and abetting actions against lawyers in an attempt to discipline
lawyers and to define professional responsibility standards. The most
prominent of these actions, In re Carter,77 is discussed in part III of
this Article.
II. PRIMARY LIABILITY AFTER CENTRAL BANK
A. The Central Bank Decision78
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court applied a different
methodology in defining Section 10(b) actions by examining the lan-
guage of the text.79 In cases where the text could not resolve the is-
sue, the Court then attempted to infer what Congress would have
done by looking at the entire statutory scheme. Professor Daniel Fis-
chel, following the Court's methodology in 10b-5 cases, concluded that
Section 10(b) should not be interpreted to include aiding and abetting
actions.80 Although all eleven circuits had recognized aiding and abet-
ting actions,"' several courts had issued opinions questioning Rule
75. Lewis D. Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers:
An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 Colum.
L. Rev. 412, 421 (1974).
76. See, e.g., Special Issue, 30 Bus. Law. 1-227 (1975) (examining the responsibili-
ties and liabilities of lawyers and accountants). The voluminous commentary written
about the case at the time did not mention the contemporaneous events of Watergate
in which lawyers' professional responsibility played a prominent role. The environ-
ment created by Watergate may have added impetus to the SEC's active pursuit of the
case although the case was originally filed in 1972, before the facts in Watergate be-
came known.
77. Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
78. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). Justice Kennedy
wrote the opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Thomas joined. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg joined.
79. See supra note 15.
80. Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act
of 1934, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 80, 111 (1981).
81. Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Central Bank that all 11 Courts of
Appeals had recognized a private cause of action for aiding and abetting. Central
Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2204 [Vol. 64
1996] LIABILITY AFTER CENTRAL BANK 2205
10b-5 as the basis for aiding and abetting actions.' The stage was set
for the Supreme Court's opinion in Central Bank.8
The issue the defendant bank trustee appealed in Central Bank was
whether recklessness or intent was the correct scienter standard when
the bank did not owe a duty to the plaintiff.8 The parties and the
lower courts had all assumed the existence of an aiding and abetting
cause of action.as The Supreme Court asked the parties to brief the
issue of whether the cause of action existed.8 The Court's majority
opinion framed the issue as "whether private civil liability under sec-
tion 10(b) extends as well to those who do not engage in the manipu-
lative or deceptive practice but who aid and abet the violation."
The opinion focused on the scope of conduct prohibited by the lan-
guage of Section 10(b). Following the strict textual construction ap-
proach used in earlier decisions,88 the Court examined the statute's
language to determine that its text did not mention aiding and abet-
82. Akin v. Q-L Invs., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that the
Supreme Court's methodology of statutory construction presented a "powerful argu-
ment" against aider and abettor liability); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Statnes &
Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring an aider and abettor defendant to
commit a "manipulative or deceptive" act to be held liable); SEC v. Seaboard Corp.,
677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that the Supreme Court's strict statu-
tory construction approach rejects an expansive reading of the Securities Acts that
includes aiding and abetting and other "add-on" theories).
83. The Central Bank decision has received extensive treatment in other articles.
See David S. Ruder, The Future of Aiding and Abetting and Rule 10b-5 After Central
Bank of Denver, 49 Bus. Law. 1479 (1994) (providing a background into aiding and
abetting and the development of the law under Rule 10b-5 and urging Congress to
amend § 10 to provide aider and abettor liability); Joel Seligman, The Implications of
Central Bank, 49 Bus. Law. 1429 (1994) (criticizing the majority opinion in Central
Bank, and encouraging the legislative reversal of the Central Bank holding); Lisa K.
Wager & John E. Failla, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Farst Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A. - The Beginning of an End, Or Will Less Lead to More?, 49 Bus. Law.
1451 (1994) (explaining the effects of the Central Bank decision and setting forth sev-
eral alternative theories of aider and abettor liability under the securities laws); see
also Edward C. Brewer, III & John L. Latham, SEC v. Central Bank: A Draft Opin-
ion for the Court's Conference, 50 Bus. Law. 19 (1994) (considering a hypothetical
situation and concluding that the Central Bank decision precludes the SEC from pur-
suing aiding and abetting claims in civil enforcement actions). But see Simon M.
Lome, Central Bank of Denver v. SEC. 49 Bus. Law. 1467 (1994) (considering a hy-
pothetical situation and concluding that the SEC may enforce aider and abettor cases
for 10(b) and 10b-5 violations even in the aftermath of Central Bank).
84. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1444 (1994).
85. See id. at 1443-44.
86. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2927, 2927 (1993).
87. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443.
88. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200-01
(1976); see also Pinter v. Dahi, 486 U.S. 622, 632 (1988) (stating that "broadened con-
struction is not appropriate in litigation arising under federal regulatory statutes");
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L Rev. 13, 14 (1995) (acknowl-
edging that courts have employed strict textualsim but arguing that strict textualism is
"intellectually incoherent").
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ting.s9 The Court concluded that aiding and abetting a Section 10(b)
violation is not actionable. Congress had not used the words "aid" or
"abet" in the statute and liability for conduct could not extend beyond
the scope of conduct prohibited by the statute.90 The Court recon-
firmed prior cases that limited Section 10(b) to deceptive or manipula-
tive acts. This proscription, the Court reasoned, "does not include
giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or deceptive
act."91
The Court confirmed its reasoning by explaining that one element
necessary for a violation-reliance-was absent in the aiding and
abetting context.9 If the court were to hold otherwise, a defendant
who aided and abetted a primary violator of the statute could be held
liable without the plaintiff having to show he relied on the aider and
abettor's statements or actions.93 The Court noted this "would disre-
gard the careful limits on 10b-5 recovery mandated by earlier cases." 94
89. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1994).
90. Id at 1448.
91. Id. The Court, noting that the statute itself resolved the issue, was willing to
engage in an examination of how the issue would have been addressed if the text had
failed to settle it. The Court "attempt[ed] to infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have
addressed the issue had the 10b-5 action been included as an express provision in the
1934 Act.'" Id. (citation omitted). The Court addressed the SEC's contention that
Congress generally legislated with an understanding of basic principles of tort law and
that aiding and abetting liability was "well established in both civil and criminal ac-
tions by 1934 [and] Congress intended to include aiding and abetting liability in the
1934 Act." Id. at 1450 (citations omitted). The Court, as it had in recent decisions,
relied on the language of the express private remedies of the Securities Acts as a
model, reasoning that the 73rd Congress would likely have designed the right of ac-
tion in a manner similar to the other rights of action in the Securities Acts. Id. at 1451-
52; see Musick, Peeler, & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2089-92 (1993).
Musick recognized a right to contribution under § 10(b), stating that the express rights
of contribution contained in Sections 9 and 18 of the Acts were important features of
the federal securities laws and that consistency requires the adoption of a contribution
rule for the right of action existing under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 2090-91.
The Central Bank Court reviewed the express private causes of action under Sec-
tions 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act and Sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act to establish that
none of them expressly imposed liability on those who may aid or abet the prohibited
conduct contained in those sections. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449. Section 11 of
the 1933 Act prohibits false statements or omissions of material fact in registration
statements and identifies different categories of defendants subject to liability for a
violation, omitting aiders and abettors. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). Section 12 of the
1933 Act forbids the sale of unregistered, nonexempt securities and the sale of securi-
ties by the use of a materially false misstatement or omission. Id. § 77(1). Section 12
limits liability to persons who "offers or sells" the security. Id. § 77. Section 9 of the
Exchange Act prohibits one from taking part in manipulative acts. Il § 78i. Section
18 prohibits one from making misleading statements in reports filed with the SEC. Id.
§ 78r. The Court reasoned that because Congress did not attach aiding and abetting
liability to any express private action, Congress would not have intended to expand
the defendant class by attaching aiding and abetting liability to an implied pnvate
action under Rule 10b-5. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1449-50.
94. Id. at 1450.
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The Court rejected all arguments advanced by the respondents and
the SEC, including policy arguments.95 In discussing the policy con-
siderations, the Court sided with the conservative reformers in the na-
tional debate over the scope of liability in securities fraud actions.96
95. The plaintiff and the SEC argued, and the Court rejected, that: (1) Congress
legislated with an understanding of the principles of tort law and thus intended to
include aiding and abetting liability in the 1934 Act; (2) Congress's silence on aiding
and abetting when it amended the securities laws on several occasions suggested that
Congress acquiesced in the courts' interpretation of Section 10(b); (3) policy consider-
ations supported the inclusion of aiding and betting in a Section 10(b) action; and (4)
the criminal statute specifically prohibiting aiding and abetting strongly suggested the
existence of a civil remedy. Id at 1450-55.
96. Class action private securities litigation is a subject of intense national debate.
The issues in the debate are analytically distinct. The first issue is whether there
should be any private remedy for securities fraud. A consensus appears to favor a
remedy. The second issue concerns the substantive rules of that remedy. This Article
deals with those substantive rules. The third issue encompasses the procedural and
substantive rules of the class action itself and the market for these actions exploited
by lawyers. The second and third issues are too often enmeshed, consequently creat-
ing more heat and adding less light to the debate.
The Court was aware that its Central Bank decision to eliminate aiding and abetting
would lend support to those who seek to reform class action private securities litiga-
tion by revising procedures and limiting the scope of the remedies. The Court was
sympathetic to the need to limit "vexatious litigation." The opinion referred explicitly
to reformist arguments and their statistics in the securities litigation debate. ld at
1453-54.
Rule 10b-5 and private securities litigation also have academic detractors. See, e-g.,
Bromberg & Lowenenfels, supra note 7, at 770-73 (calling generally for reform in
securities litigation); Fischel, supra note 80, at 122-24 (same); Grundfest, supra note
38, at 1011 (advocating a redefinition of 10b-5 claims).
Professionals, particularly accountants, have attacked what they perceive as an ex-
plosion in meritless class action securities litigation. They have charged that each
time the market price of a company's shares tumbled 10%, especially in unseasoned
companies such as high tech issues, the strike suit lawyer pulled out his roster of
professional plaintiff-shareholders, printed out a form complaint, and filed a class ac-
tion against the issuer alleging that the issuer's disclosure documents contained mis-
representations of material fact or material omissions. In a matter of days, the first
lawsuit filed in the courthouse was followed by a filing of a bevy of "me-too" actions.
The class-action complaints frequently included allegations that collateral partici-
pants, usually underwriters and accountants, aided and abetted the issuer's alleged
fraud. Reformers observe that the defendants, under threat of joint and several liabil-
ity for huge damage amounts, settled with the strike suit lawyers who walked away
from a meritless suit with a hefty fee. In the end, the shareholders, the strike suit
lawyer's putative clients, paid the costs of this meritless litigation. The company's
value (and the shareholder's pro rata share) declined because of the company's litiga-
tion costs and the higher expenses of paying professionals to assume the risks of this
kind of litigation when marketing the company's securities. Reformers also argue
that small companies are denied access to professional services and capital markets
because of increased litigation risks and expenses.
The defenders of class action securities litigation and private securities fraud reme-
dies urge reformers to proceed cautiously when criticizing perceived litigation abuses.
They emphasize the desirability of private remedies to compensate injured investors,
the necessity for private remedies to augment SEC enforcement of the securities laws,
and the importance of private remedies to deter fraud and to discipline the securities
markets. They argue that private securities litigation has increased only moderately
compared with the increase in the number of securities transactions. Moreover, they
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The Court concluded, however, with an admonition that secondary
actors in the securities markets are not necessarily free from all
liability:
Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement
(or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may
point out that the abuses in securities litigation procedures are endemic to all class
actions and should be dealt with as appropriate revisions of class action procedure in
general; the procedural flaws should not be used as a pretext for curtailing substantive
remedies against wrongdoing that injures investors. See generally A Call for My Pro-
fession's Epiphany, 1994: Hearings on Federal Securities Fraud Litigation Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Abraham J. Briloff, Professor,
Baruch College) (arguing that Congress should not further limit causes of action for
defrauded investors because SEC enforcement needs augmentation); What We Know
and Don't Know: A Very Short Primer on Securities Class Actions: Hearings on Fed-
eral Securities Fraud Litigation Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)(testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia Univ. L. Sch.) (arguing that the
merits of such actions are frequently considered by class plaintiffs and attorneys and
that legislative action should focus on further enhancing merit relevance); Testimony
of Donald C. Langevoort: Hearings on Federal Securities Fraud Litigation Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Donald C. Langevoort, Profes-
sor, Vanderbilt Univ. Sch. of L.) (claiming that securities litigation for fraud should be
based on the deterence that private causes of action provide); H.R. 417 - Securities
Fraud Litigation Reform: Hearings on Federal Securities Fraud Litigation Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Jon Lukomnik, Deputy Comp-
troller, City of New York) (arguing that institutional investors are well situated to
enhance enforcement of securities fraud violations); Prepared Statement of Arthur R.
Miller Hearings on Federal Securities Fraud Litigation Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Arthur R. Miller, Professor, Harvard Univ. L.
Sch.) (asserting that securities fraud class actions are but one subset of complex litiga-
tion and that reform proposals should have general applicability); Statement of Ralph
Nader Hearings on Federal Securities Fraud Litigation Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Ralph Nader) (urging the formation of Financial
Consumers Associations to augment government enforcement securities law); Testi-
mony of Joel Seligman: Hearings on Federal Securities Fraud Litigation Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Joel Seligman, Professor, Univ.
of Michigan L. Sch.) (citing mistaken statistics on the increase of securities fraud liti-
gation and arguing for a legislative overruling of Central Bank).
The reformers organized and received support in Congress. Legislation to reform
private securities litigation was introduced and died in Congress in 1991 and 1993. See
H.R. 5828, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 3181, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.
417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). In 1994, the reformers landed a reform plank on the
Republican's "Contract With America" which played a prominent role in the Novem-
ber 1994 elections in which the Republicans captured both houses for the first time in
40 years. In December 1995, Congress enacted The Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995, which tightened procedural and substantive requirements for pri-
vate class actions. See infra part III.C.
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be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the re-
quirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.9
Justice Stevens, writing for the four dissenting Justices, argued that the
"'settled construction of an important federal statute should not be
disturbed unless and until Congress so decides.' "98 Justice Stevens
argued that the Court's reasoning would eliminate all forms of secon-
dary liability "not expressly spelled out in the securities statutes," in-
cluding conspiracy and respondent superior liability.99 Justice Stevens
observed that the Court's literal reading of the statute would also pre-
clude the SEC from bringing aiding and abetting actions.100 Congress,
however, expressly provided in the 1995 Reform Act that the SEC can
bring aiding and abetting actions.101
B. Unresolved Issues
The Central Bank decision cuts off claims against more remote col-
lateral participants, such as banks, who cannot be linked to the mis-
representations or omissions of the issuer. Aiding and abetting
actions were overbroad in this respect because even under an expan-
sive interpretation, the securities laws do not contemplate that partici-
pants in transactions tangential to the sale of securities assume duties
to the investing public.102 Investors, who ultimately bear the costs of
97. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. CL 1439, 1455 (1994).
98. Id. at 1458 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 1460 & n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Aiding and abetting and conspir-
acy are different concepts: Civil conspiracy requires proof of an agreement between
the coconspirators, with one actor committing at least one of the acts in furtherance of
the conspiracy. Aiding and abetting requires only knowing assistance. See Ruder,
supra note 29, at 627. The facts that support one concept can often support both.
Conspiracy is a more demanding standard to prove because it requires proof of know-
ing conduct to show that the conspirators made an express or tacit agreement. See
Roberts v. Heim, 670 F. Supp. 1466, 1483-84 (N.D. CaL 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nor. Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1002 (1988). If facts prove that a lawyer conspired with the client,
her conduct would remove the lawyer from having acted qua lawyer. Aiding and
abetting, on the other hand, can be consistent with reckless behavior so that it is the
more important concept with respect to the lawyer acting qua lawyer. See James D.
Cox, Just Desserts For Accountants and Attorneys after Bank of Denver 12-14 (1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Fordham Law Review). Professor Cox ar-
gues that after Central Bank, it is doubtful that primary participant liability will be
established using a conspiracy approach because in applying the Court's strict textual-
ism, the word "conspiracy" does not appear in the statutory text. See id. at 12. Profes-
sor Cox concludes that the conspiracy itself is not proscribed, but the acts of the
conspirators are a violation and the agreement could be a basis to link the actors to
the acts of at least one of the conspirators to establish their participation in a fraudu-
lent scheme. Id. at 15.
100. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
101. See infra part mI.C.
102. The bank that was sued in Central Bank was acting as a trustee pursuant to a
contract and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 that specifically excluded the bank from
assuming any duties with respect to the bondholders before a default on the bonds.
First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 900-01 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub non
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all investor protection, should not be required to pay the substantial
additional costs for the marginal benefits, if any, of scrutiny of transac-
tions provided by these remote collateral participants.
Securities lawyers, however, should not be sanguine that this same
reasoning will apply to them. Even though conservative winds are
blowing through the country to reduce the amount of consumer litiga-
tion, part of their force is driven by a perception that it is the lawyers
who create excess litigation. Lawyers are not likely to see many
friendly faces in the courtroom. Moreover, lawyers tend to get sued
when there are allegations of serious fraud so the 1995 Reform Act's
procedural and pleading restrictions imposed on private class actions
are not as likely to affect the number of actions brought against them.
Lawyers are among the core participants who play an integral role
in the securities issuance process. Relying on the logic of the common
law of joint tortfeasors, and without using the words "aid or abet,"
courts will continue to examine the conduct of those core participants
to determine whether they will be held liable as primary violators.
The courts have seldom parsed the distinction between conduct that
constitutes a primary violation and conduct that is aiding and abetting.
Until Central Bank, the distinction was not only difficult, but from a
practical view, unnecessary because both classes of actors were jointly
and severally liable. Courts instead focused their attention on the
aider's and abettor's state of mind and whether substantial assistance
was given to the primary violator.'0 3 The relevant issues were what
the lawyer knew and when he knew it. If there was evidence that the
lawyer learned of the fraud and had not thereafter acted in an appro-
priate manner, an inference could be drawn that the lawyer knowingly
aided and abetted the wrongdoing.
After Central Bank, courts will be forced to distinguish the lawyer's
conduct between acts that constitute primary violations and those that
do not rise to that level. Central Bank offers no assistance in making
those distinctions other than to exclude conduct on which the plaintiff
does not rely. Thus, it is not enough for a person who, throwing in his
lot with other wrongdoers, engages behind the scene in acts that are
then packaged by the seller and sold to deceived investors. Regard-
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994). Presumably, if the bank
had assumed duties to the bondholders, the cost of those services and the risks as-
sumed would have been included in the price that the trustee charged and would
have been borne by the bondholders. First Interstate Bank, 969 F.2d at 900. The dis-
trict court and the Tenth Circuit agreed that the bank did not owe a duty to the bond-
holders. Basically, defendants who provide routine financial services in connection
with a securities transaction have been protected from suit in the absence of an estab-
lishment of duties to third parties. See, e.g., Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477,
1480-81 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that bank was not liable for aiding and abetting
when bank's knowledge of company's shaky financial situation did not impose duty of
disclosure), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989).
103. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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less of how reprehensible the defendant's conduct, the issue becomes
whether the plaintiff is entitled to rely on that conduct.
In a misrepresentation case, if the plaintiff can show that the de-
fendant, including a lawyer, made a material misrepresentation on
which the plaintiff relied, the plaintiff can establish a primary violation
provided all other elements of the action are proven.'0 In a nondis-
closure case, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a preex-
isting duty to speak to the plaintiff, which the defendant breached by
remaining silent.'0 5 Two issues are raised. First, under what circum-
stances will the material misrepresentations made to the investors be
deemed to have been made by the lawyer acting qua lawyer so the
investor can established that he relied on the lawyer's conduct? Sec-
ond, under what circumstances will a lawyer acting qua lawyer owe a
duty of disclosure to the investor, the breach of which will cause the
investor's reliance to be presumed?
C. Misrepresentations
Courts will hold lawyers liable for primary violations when they
make material misrepresentations to investors. 106 Courts can elect to
104. See infra part II.C.
105. See infra part fI.D.
106. Professor Fischel concluded that under certain circumstances, collateral par-
ticipants may be held liable as primary violators of the rule. Fischel, supra note 80, at
102-03. He defined "core conduct" meant to be deterred by Section 10(b) as "the
making of misrepresentations which distort the transmission of accurate information."
Id at 108. He argues that collateral participants can be held liable as primary viola-
tors for the "core conduct" provided the other elements of liability are satisfied, such
as scienter and the "in connection with" requirement. Id. He noted, for example, that
accountants can be held liable for knowingly preparing and issuing false financial
statements and lawyers can be liable for preparing false opinion letters. Id. In other
words, only when the collateral participant's material misrepresentations are in-
tended to reach the investor, may the actor risk violating Section 10(b). See id. Pro-
fessor Fischel does not include within "core conduct" those fraudulent practices or
schemes other than the transmission of misrepresentations, such as the scheme in
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968),
aff'd 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). His use of the
word "distort" and the limits he would put on nondisclosure cases suggests that the
prohibited conduct with which he is concerned is limited to misrepresentations and
half-truths referred to in subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5. His concept fails to deal ade-
quately with omissions.
Moreover, fraud comes in a variety of forms that all have one element in common.
In order for the fraudulent activity to benefit the wrongdoer, the person who parts
with his money must be deceived. There is nothing to suggest that Congress intended
that "deceptive conduct" be as narrowly construed as represented by Professor Fis-
chel's "core conduct." Indeed Congress more likely intended the term to be broad
enough to encompass all kinds of inventive deceptive practices which the SEC could
prohibit through rule making. A broad definition of fraud is consistent with the rest
of the securities statutory scheme.
The Supreme Court has held that the scope of prohibited conduct under rule 10b-5
cannot be broader than the meaning given by Congress in Section 10(b). Central
Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994); see also Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (stating that the SEC's interpretation "cannot
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hold a participant liable only for misre presentations that appear in a
document signed by that participant. 10 The speaker is easy to iden-
tify-the accountant is responsible only for the financial information
he certifies; the lawyer, for his opinion letters on which an investor
may reasonably rely; and the issuer, for all other disclosures, usually
made through the prospectus or offering memorandum. This ap-
proach has the advantage of simplifying the application of the laws
and reducing securities litigation. Lawyers acting qua lawyer could
easily prevent being named as defendants by avoiding any contact
with investors although some exposure would remain. Tax opinion
letters would cause the greatest risk. Other legal opinion letters re-
quired to be filed with the SEC could become an issue, but that is not
likely. The risk of representing an issuer would thus decline
appreciably.
1. The Participation Issue
Courts could chart another course. Courts would deem the misrep-
resentations in every disclosure document to have been made by all
defendants who participated in drafting the document, thus returning
to the common law concept of joint tortfeasors being held primarily
liable as a group. In securities transactions, the gathering and the
transmission of information is a group project and the transmission of
information is not a one shot transaction-information is continu-
ously transmitted and transformed over a period of time with different
actors joining and leaving the group during that time. Information
that was accurate when first disclosed can become inaccurate and
other information can be introduced into the continuum. The reality
exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b)"). Even so,
nothing in Central Bank implies that the meaning of "deceptive conduct" is limited
simply to distortions in the transmission of inaccurate information.
107. A Massachusetts district court adopted this approach. In In re Kendall Square
Research Corp., 868 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1994), plaintiffs alleged that the issuer,
Kendall Square, materially overstated revenues from the sale of high performance
parallel computer systems. Id. at 26-27. Price Waterhouse, the issuer's independent
auditor from 1989 until June 1994, had issued a 1992 unqualified audit opinion re-
ported in the issuer's Form 10-K. Id. at 27. Price Waterhouse had reviewed and ap-
proved quarterly financial reports and the representations made in the prospectuses
of the issuer's 1992 and 1993 stock offerings, including representations of revenues. Id.
at 28. Price Waterhouse also had participated in structuring several of the sales trans-
actions that were subsequently reversed. Id. Plaintiffs' claims as to Price
Waterhouse's liability for the certified financial statements were not dismissed. Id.
The court found, however, that Price Waterhouse's review and approval of the in-
terim financial statements did not make those statements "attributable" to Price
Waterhouse and "thus Price Waterhouse cannot be found liable for making a material
misstatement." Id. The court, in dismissing the claims, stated that the conduct was
aiding and abetting at most. Id. The court drew a line between conduct that was a
primary violation and aiding and abetting conduct without articulating any criteria. Id.
It was apparently willing to accept the formality of who signed the document. See id.
The court may not have deemed this issue to have been of much importance because
the auditor still faced liability for the audited financial statements.
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is that decisions and events in securities transactions take place in
complex environments. Courts are not likely to ignore that reality in
assessing liability against those who participate in wrongdoing. To
find primary violations, information will now be deemed to have been
transmitted to the investor by some or all members of the core group
who knowingly assisted in the preparation of the misrepresentations
even though they are not identified in the document as having au-
thored them.
Post-Central Bank decisions support this view. In In re ZZZZ Best
Securities Litigation ("ZZZZ Best"),10 8 a California district court de-
108. 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994). ZZZZ Best Co., Inc, ("ZZ Best"), pur-
portedly the nation's largest carpet cleaning company, offered its shares to the public
beginning in December 1986. 1& at 963-64. The company collapsed into bankruptcy
within a year. Id. at 963. ZZZZ Best's founder was ultimately convicted and impris-
oned for fraud and embezzlement. kle Plaintiffs brought a securities class action suit
against multiple defendants, alleging that a fraudulent scheme was carried out
through a series of false and misleading "public statements regarding ZZZZ Best, its
finances, management, and future business prospects." ld. at 964.
Plaintiffs' claims against the accountants, Ernst & Young ("E & Y"), arose out of E
& Y's issuance of a "review report [("the Review Report")] on first quarter interim
financial information... included in Z Best's December 1986 offering prospectus."
Id. at 964. ZZZZ Best's 1985 financial statements had been certified by another ac-
counting firm. Id. E & Y was apparently retained sometime during 1986 and simply
reviewed the first quarter unaudited financial statements prepared by 7Z77 Bests
management- Id. E & Y's Review Report stated: "[W]e are not aware of any mate-
rial modifications that should be made to the consolidated interim financial state-
ments referred to above for them to be in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles." Id. E & Y admitted that Central Bank did not affect their
liability for the Review Report, which was E & Y's representation. lit at 965. Plain-
tiffs also claimed that E & Y was liable for 13 other false publicly released statements,
including press releases, a supplement to the prospectus, a Form 10-Q quarterly re-
port, and a Form 8-K report ("the Other Statements"). Id. at 964-65. Plaintiffs as-
serted that E & Y was intimately involved in the creation, review, or issuance of the
Other Statements, although the statements did not include any public indication that
E & Y had anything to do with them. id. at 965.
E & Y moved for summary judgement on the Other Statements claims, arguing that
even if E & Y had reviewed, edited, or approved the Other Statements, that conduct
was a secondary act and therefore constituted an allegation of aiding and abetting that
Central Bank had eliminated. Id at 966. "E & Y contend[ed] that Central Bank 'elim-
inate[s] claims brought against all those alleged to have "participated" in the primary
wrongdoer's statement but not to have made a statement to the public directly." I at
968. Plaintiffs argued that despite the fact that E & Y had not actually issued the
statements, E & Y, knowing that the statements were based, in part, on its statements
and also knowing that the false and misleading statements were being disseminated to
the public, could be held to have participated in the making of the misrepresentations.
Id. at 968-69. Plaintiffs further argued they had "submitted sufficient evidence to
suggest that E & Y's participation... was extensive enough to attribute th[e] mis-
statements ... to E & Y." ld. at 970.
The court, conceding that "this case create[d] a close call and perhaps one of first
impression," ruled for the plaintiffs, lit at 970. The court stated that its reasoning was
supported by SEC v. Seabord Corp., 677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982), and In re Union
Carbide Corp. Cons. Prod. Bus., 676 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). ZZZZ Best, 864 F.
Supp. at 970. In Seaboard, the accountants would be held liable as primary violators
for misrepresentations of the company's certified financial condition. Seabord, 677
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nied a defendant accounting firm's motion for summary judgment on
the issue of whether the accountants were liable for the company's
material misrepresentations in issuing press releases, a supplement to
the prospectus, and reports filed with the SEC."°9 In holding that the
allegations stated a primary violation against the accountants, the
court determined that the issuer's disclosure documents, which the ac-
countants assisted in preparing, could also be representations of the
accountants." 0 Subsequent to the ZZZZ Best decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in In re Software Toolworks Inc. Securities Litigation,"' reversed
F.2d at 1312. The ZZZZ Best court admitted in a footnote that the accountants in
Seaboard had certified the financial statements. ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 970 n.12.
Therefore, Seabord does not offer support for the attribution of unidentified state-
ments. ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 970 (citing Union Carbide, 676 F. Supp. at 467-69).
In Union Carbide, Morgan Stanley unsuccessfully argued that financial projections it
prepared could not be attributed to the firm because it had not announced the results.
Union Carbide, 676 F. Supp. at 467-69. The Union Carbide court held that because
the accountants had prepared the projections and participated in the fraud, the pro-jections could be attributed to the accountants and they could be held primarily liable.
Id. The ZZZZ Best court found that even if the public could not reasonably attribute
the additional misstatements to E & Y, "the securities market still relied on those
public statements and anyone intricately involved in their creation and the resulting
deception should be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5." ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp.
at 970. The court was also willing to find that liability under Rule 10b-5 was not
restricted solely to misrepresentations or omissions, but could also be predicated on
subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, which prohibit the use of any scheme to defraud
and engage in any course of business that operates as a fraud. Id. at 972. However, if
the conduct is not "deceptive conduct" within the meaning of Section 10(b), the
ZZZZ Best court's reliance on subsections (a) and (c) will not likely support alternate
grounds for affirmance.
In addressing the reliance issue, the ZZZZ Best court stated that in a fraud-on-the-
market case, reliance can be presumed because the market price reflects considera-
tion of all public information, including the materially misleading statements. Id. at
973. Admitting that the market must rely on the statements or omissions of identified
defendants, the court nevertheless concluded that if plaintiffs could prove that:
E & Y's participation in the preparation or issuance of those additional
statements was so extensive that the statements should reasonably be attrib-
uted to E & Y, the market need only rely on the statements or omissions,
not E & Y's participation. Thus, the focus of the reliance issue is shifted
from E & Y's alleged participation to the actual misleading statements or
omissions themselves.
Id. at 973.
109. Id. at 970.
110. Id.
111. 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1995), amending in part, 38 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1994),
rev'g in part and aff'g in part, 789 F. Supp. 1489 (N. D. Cal. 1992). The Ninth Circuit's
first opinion reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
accountants. Software Toolworks, 38 F.3d at 1083. In that opinion, the court de-
scribed the misleading letters sent to the SEC. Id. at 1090. The SEC, in a comment
letter to a draft of the prospectus, told Toolworks it should disclose in the prospectus
preliminary financial results for Toolworks' second quarter. Id. Toolworks wrote to
the SEC that preliminary financial data was not available, while acknowledging to the
professionals that some data was actually available. lId Another letter to the SEC
was alleged to be stated that the letter " 'was prepared after extensive review and
discussions with... Deloitte' [the accountants] and actually referred the SEC to two
Deloitte partners for further information." Id. at 1090 n.3 (omission in original). The
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in part summary judgment in favor of accountants and underwriters,
holding that the defendants could be liable as primary violators for
participating in drafting the materially misleading letters that the is-
suer wrote to the SEC, and for the failure of the prospectus to disclose
poor financial performance in the company's second quarter. 1 2
In addition, the district court in Employers Insurance v. Musick,
Peeler, & Garrett,"13 considering the case on remand from the
Supreme Court," 4 held that a claim was stated against the lawyers for
primary liability." 5 The complaint alleged that the lawyers drafted
the entire prospectus, which contained material misrepresentations,
and that they were responsible for omissions arising out of the overall
representations made in the disclosure document.'1 6
letter to the SEC was misleading because a "model" sales agreement attached to the
letter materially differed from the sales agreement in actual use. Id. at 1091.
The court stated that Deloitte should have been aware that the model agreement
was false and misleading and inclusion of it in the letter could raise a "reasonable
inference" of Deloitte's knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsehoods. Id. The
court affirmed summary judgement in favor of Deloitte for their preparation of the
audited financial statements appearing in the prospectus on the ground that the plain-
tiffs' showing of mere misapplication of some accounting principles was not sufficient
to establish scienter. Id. at 1089-91.
In its second opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that the letters could also be attributed
to the underwriters as well as the accountants. Softvare Toolvorks, 50 F.3d at 625.
The court stated:
The plaintiffs presented evidence... that the letter was a joint effort of all
professionals working on the offering, including the Underwriters. In fact
[Toolsworks' lawyer] specifically testified that, "[w]hen the letter finally
went to the SEC, all parties had been involved in the process of creating it.
There had been conference calls discussing it and comments and changes
made by a lot of different members of the working group."
Id. (alteration in original).
Because the lawyers in the case settled, the extent of liability, if any, for their role in
drafting the letters to the SEC is not known. The logic that held the working group
responsible for the letter should apply to the lawyers as well. Securities lawyers for
issuers usually assume a leadership role in the communications between their clients
and the SEC during a public securities offering.
112. Id at 629.
113. 871 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
114. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garrett, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993),
aff'g on other grounds, 954 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court had granted
certiorari for the narrow purpose of resolving a circuit split on whether a cause of
action for contribution is permitted under section 10(b). In holding that contribution
was permitted, the Court distinguished between theories of liability (e.g., aiding and
abetting) and theories of recovery, such as contribution. Id at 2088.
115. Musick, Peeler, 871 F. Supp. at 388.
116. Id. at 388-89. The defendant lawyers argued that the claim was based solely
on the lawyer's failure to disclose and that, therefore, the defendants would be liable
only if they had a duty to disclose. Id. at 388. The court distinguished a failure to
disclose case as one in which the defendant remained completely silent. Id. at 389.
The court was willing to attribute to the lawyers the misrepresentations and the omis-
sions that made the representations misleading who had assisted in the drafting of the
prospectus. Id.
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These cases demonstrate that courts will hold that misleading dis-
closures are disclosures made by all those who participate in their
preparation; thus, the plaintiff may establish reliance with respect to
each defendant. The circumstances in which courts are willing to attri-
bute authorship to the group are exactly the same kind of circum-
stances in which pre-Central Bank courts found that the issuer was the
primary violator and that the other participants aided and abetted the
issuer.
To the extent that the participation test is unclear and offers little
predictive value," 7 Central Bank has not changed the playing field for
lawyers, accountants, and other core players who participate in the
disclosure process. The participation test has the disadvantage of an
ad hoc determination as to the amount of participation necessary,
which can produce unfair results in some instances. Among all of the
issuers' disclosure documents, it may be difficult to ascertain which
documents were prepared only by the issuer, which by one member of
the securities professionals, and which by several members of the
group. The courts, as they did with aiding and abetting, will sort it out
based on the inferences of who acted with scienter. As with common
law torts, the courts will be less concerned with the conduct of each
member of the group as the evidence increases of his intent to partici-
pate in a fraudulent scheme." 8
The courts' exercise of discretion as to how much participation is
enough to sort out the respective responsibilities of the group opens
the door for the same mistakes made with a loose application of an
aiding and abetting standard. For instance, in the ZZZZ Best case,
the court was willing to let stand plaintiffs bare allegations that the
accountants were liable for the issuer's thirteen false, publicly released
documents. The accountants admitted they were responsible for
drafting their own report, but it would have been unusual for account-
ants to have participated in drafting all the documents for which they
were accused. The willingness to impose liability on deep pocket de-
fendants, without examining closely the basis of that liability, may be
too tempting, especially when dealing with egregious facts such as
those in the ZZZZ Best case.
From an operational perspective, courts will be tempted to use an
indiscriminate participation test in deciding pretrial motions because
of the limited time they have to deal with highly complex factual alle-
117. Aiding and abetting actions also lack a firm underpinning. Justice Kennedy, in
Central Bank, worried that aiding and abetting rules were "unclear," which "leads to
the undesirable result of decisions 'made on an ad hoc basis, offering little predictive
value' to those who provide services to participants in the securities business." Central
Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1454 (1994) (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486
U.S. 622, 652 (1988)). Justice Kennedy's complaint may be more accurately charged
against § 10 and Rule 10b-5 itself.
118. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Causation, Courts and Congress: A Study of Con-
tradiction in the Federal Securities Laws, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 1027, 1036 (1990).
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gations and the deference they are required to give in favor of stating
a claim. The 1995 Reform Act, however, attempts to remove much of
the court's discretion with respect to private securities class actions
and reverses the usual presumption in favor of stating a claim under
notice pleading.119 The Act's pleading procedures resemble in com-
plexity the procedures required for derivative claims under Delaware
state law.'2 Similar to decisions made in derivative actions, courts
will exercise their discretion in favor of stating claims when egregious
fact patterns are presented that do not pass the judge's sensitive nose.
If the claims survive a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment mo-
tion, lawyers usually try to negotiate settlements because of the dam-
age to reputation associated with the notoriety of the trial and perhaps
the fear of unsympathetic juries. They will now be able to negotiate
within the framework of proportionate liability rules of the 1995 Re-
form Act. 2 The difficulty with the settlement process is that it does
not allow for a determination of whether the lawyer acted knowingly,
negligently, or something in between.
Once the participation test is accepted, the implication for lawyer
liability is more troublesome than for accountants. The accountant's
liability for group-prepared misleading financial statements or other
documents that deal with accounting issues can be explained in most
cases by the accountant's duty to correct misleading certified financial
statements that are directly attributable to them.
Lawyers, on the other hand, routinely assist clients in disclosing a
wide variety of business information that is not susceptible to audit,
and in matters about which lawyers have no special expertise. The
disclosure process is continuous from the initial public offering,
through quarterly and annual reports to the SEC, proxy solicitations,
and press releases. If the issuer's information were routinely attrib-
uted to the lawyer because of the lawyer's active participation in its
preparation, the lawyer would become a guarantor of the issuer's dis-
closure."2 If, for instance, the lawyer and the client drafted a press
release to address rumors surrounding merger talks, and the client
then told his lawyer that he was going to use the press release, but
would deny that the merger talks were underway, against the lawyer's
advice, has the lawyer participated sufficiently in the misrepresenta-
tion to be liable for it? Would it make a difference if the lawyer only
advised the client without participating in the writing? Should it?
119. See infra part IILC.
120. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 321-330 (1994).
121. This procedure may not make the investors whole, especially when the issuer
is insolvent, but it will act as a deterrent against wrongful conduct.
122. Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469,475 (4th Cir.
1992); see also Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496-97
(7th Cir. 1986) (stating that plaintiffs must prove not only that the defendant must
haste had knowledge of the facts, but also that the lawyer "has thrown in his lot with
the primary violatiors," or else the scienter doctrine would be superfluous).
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Lawyers could distance themselves from the disclosure drafting pro-
cess because of the added risk of liability. Lawyers may choose not to
represent those clients who present unacceptable risks because of
their lack of financial ability to pay investors' claims. This action
would presumably impair the quality of disclosure, especially for new
companies, to the detriment of the investors. The word "presumably"
is used because one presumes that the securities lawyer adds value to
the quality of disclosure through the independent advice given to cli-
ents. This may only be a partial explanation for the lawyer's involve-
ment, however, especially when routine disclosure advice for
companies is now frequently performed by in house counsel.
Clients are willing to pay independent lawyers' premium legal
fees-in comparison to fees for most other legal services-in the se-
curities issuance process. The premiums paid cannot be explained en-
tirely as payment for disclosure advice that may be routinely supplied
by in house counsel or for the risk that counsel assumes. In the con-
text of a public offering, fees paid to independent securities lawyers
may represent, in effect, a purchase of the imprimatur of the securities
lawyers whose opinions provide comfort to the underwriter and who
lend their reputations in dealing with the SEC and the market. If this
is a substantial part of the value securities lawyers add to the transac-
tion, the reality should have implications in designing normative law-
yer liability and accountability rules in securities transactions. For
instance, in a rule-making process, securities lawyers who participate
in public offerings may be deemed to have signaled to the public that
they are competent, have performed due diligence, and are not aware
of any facts that would cause them to believe that the prospectus is
materially misleading. The rule would need to be predicated on stan-
dards that the lawyer should meet. A violation of those standards
should not necessarily expose the lawyer to a private action if the
rules could be enforced in more effective ways. The same standard
need not apply to giving ongoing securities law advice to clients. Rule
making, as opposed to case law development of duties, would have the
advantage of considering the role of the securities lawyer and design-
ing those rules that would provide guidance to the lawyer, his client,
and the public.
2. A Duty of Inquiry
In the context of legal opinions, the lawyer's sufficient participation
in the drafting is not the issue because there is no doubt that the law-
yer is responsible for the document he signs. The legal opinion cases
that present difficult issues usually occur in settings in which the law-
yer issues an erroneous legal opinion based on misleading facts sup-
plied by a deceitful issuer. The investor relies on the opinion even
though the opinion was not addressed to the investor. Two issues
predominate: (1) under what circumstances are investors entitled to
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rely on the lawyer's legal opinion when it is not addressed to them;
and (2) whether the lawyer has a duty of inquiry to verify the facts on
which his opinion is based."z For example, in a post-Central Bank
case, Kline v. First Western Government Securities, Inc.,124 customers
of First Western who had invested in straddle transactions sued the
law firm that had issued to its client, First Western, three tax opinion
letters over a three-year period addressing tax issues with respect to
straddle transactions.125 The letters specifically stated that the law
firm had relied on the client to provide accurate facts on which the
opinions were based and that the opinions were intended for the cli-
ent's use and should not be relied on by any other person. 6 The law
firm had not attempted to verify the facts, but it had expressly limited
the right to rely on the opinions to its client."2 Nevertheless, the in-
vestors claimed they had relied on the tax opinions in attempting to
deduct losses, which the IRS disallowed."2
In holding that the law firm was not entitled to summary judgment,
the Third Circuit addressed the circumstances in which the lawyers
had continued to issue opinion letters to their client. The law firm had
represented a previous partnership, on which First Western was
modeled, in connection with IRS civil and criminal investigations."2 9
During that representation, the law firm began representing one of
the partnership's principals in the formation of First Western and may
have helped design the straddle transactions.13" Despite the law firm's
stated limitations on reliance, the law firm was aware of at least ten
instances where potential investors contacted the firm with respect to
its three opinions given over the three-year period.1 3' The court con-
cluded that the law firm had been "put on notice that its efforts to
123. See e.g., Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
a lawyer acts recklessly when he relies on questionable assertions provided by a client
in drafting an opinion letter); Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 67
(N.D. Miss. 1978) (stating that the duty of a lawyer for an issuer of securities encom-
passes "the obligation to exercise due diligence, including a reasonable inquiry, in
connection with responsibilities [the lawyer] has voluntarily undertaken"). The law-
yer "must make a reasonable, independent investigation to detect and correct false or
misleading materials." Id
124. 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994).
125. Id at 481-82. Straddle transactions involve contracts to buy and sell the sped-
fled security in the future, so-called "forward contracts." The investor bets which
way the market is going to go and gains or loses on the difference or "spread" be-
tween the buy contract and the sell contract. Id at 482. In KIine, the contracts were to
buy and sell money market instruments at a designated interest rate on a fixed future
date. I The investor bet on whether interest rates would rise or fall and biased the
contracts on the basis of those predictions. Id.
126. Id at 483.
127. Id
128. Id at 484.
129. Id at 482.
130. Id
131. Id at 483-84.
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dissuade reliance were not always successful." 132 The court held that
the law firm could be held liable as a primary violator "for both mis-
representations and omissions where the result of either is to render
an opinion letter materially inaccurate or incomplete.' 33 The reck-
lessness requirement could be met if the plaintiffs established that the
lawyer issued the opinions "without reasonable genuine belief [of the
facts supplied by the client] or if [the opinions] ha[d] no basis."'134 The
court found that the lawyer had a limited duty to investigate the facts
on which the opinion was based. Moreover, the lawyer could not rely
on its written assertions that no one other than the client could rely on
its opinions when the lawyer had knowledge that the client was circu-
lating the opinions to potential customers.
The dissenting opinion raised a valid point in arguing that the inves-
tors' reliance on the opinion letters was unreasonable as a matter of
law.' 35 The dissent maintained that the straddle transaction investors,
who were sophisticated, were not reasonable in relying on opinions
that specifically stated that they could not rely.136 Moreover, the in-
vestors had both the resources and the responsibility to protect them-
selves through their own inquiries. The dissent concluded that the
investors had accepted the risks that these cutting edge transactions
would not pass IRS scrutiny.137
The Kline majority, however, was not willing to allow the lawyers
off so easily by simply including strong "others cannot rely" language
when the lawyers knew their client was using the opinions to sell the
investments. 38 At a minimum, Kline can be viewed as imposing a
duty to act when the lawyer is put on notice about his client's use of an
opinion beyond its stated scope. The lawyer's actions must follow the
limiting words of his opinions. When those actions are inconsistent
with the limitations, the lawyer cannot rely on the limiting language of
his own opinions as a defense.
The facts of the Kline case do not seem remarkable if we assume
that the lawyer acted with scienter instead of negligence. The case
does raise questions about the extent of a lawyer's duty of inquiry.
Lawyers need guidance in this area so that professional standards can
be established and maintained. Currently, except for the lore of the
corporate securities bar, general standards or generally accepted
guidelines do not exist.
A duty of inquiry imposes on the lawyer the need to conduct some
investigation into what the client is actually doing and not simply to
132. Id. at 484.
133. Id. at 486.
134. Id.
135. Iat at 492-500 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
136. I& at 497-98 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 496-97 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 488-90.
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rely on the client's representations. The difficulty is determining how
and to what extent this legal audit is to be accomplished and at what
cost to the transaction. Moreover, lawyers are frequently asked to
opine about transactions that the client plans to accomplish in the fu-
ture. The lawyer has no way to substantiate or investigate circum-
stances that have yet to occur, although lawyers may wish they had
this gift.
The acute difficulty is distinguishing when the lawyer acted with
recklessness or out of carelessness in undertaking the inquiry. More-
over, there is no standard to guide the lawyer on how to conduct an
inquiry. Therefore, it becomes difficult to determine if the lawyer was
so far below the mark as to be reckless in his conduct. The lawyer will
always appear more culpable after the fact. Even if liability is not
imposed for carelessness, a duty of inquiry nonetheless imposes liabil-
ity for conduct less than fraud. When he is put on notice, the lawyer is
called upon to use judgment and to question. This duty of inquiry
begins to resemble the duty of care that arises when a board of direc-
tors is put on notice to inquire about possible problems within the
company. The duty of inquiry also has elements of a "know your
client" rule. If the lawyer is aware that the client has a history that
increases risk to the transaction, that knowledge can be used against
the lawyer if the transaction turns sour.
D. Omissions
Omissions present more difficult issues, not the least of which is
distinguishing between what constitutes a material misrepresentation
or half-truth and what is essentially a failure to disclose material facts.
Assuming that a court is dealing with what is essentially a nondisclo-
sure case, the court will impose liability for failing to disclose only if it
first finds a duty to disclose.
Lawyers will be significantly affected if courts are willing to impose
a general duty to disclose material information to third parties. First,
imposing a duty to disclose may, depending upon the jurisdiction in
which the lawyer practices, create a conflict between that duty and the
lawyer's duty of professional responsibility to keep his clients' confi-
dences.139 The confidentiality rule found in professional responsibility
codes, however, could be modified by case law so that the duty to
disclose under some circumstances trumps the duty of confidentiality.
The lawyer would still face potential liability to his client if a court
subsequently found that the lawyer did not have the privilege to dis-
close under the circumstances. If a duty to disclose is placed on the
lawyer, he must have freedom from client liability to avoid a Hobson's
choice.
139. See Model Rules, supra note 2, Rule 1.6.
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1. A Duty to Disclose?
The Supreme Court in Central Bank, citing its decision in Chiarella
v. United States,14° affirmed that omissions or nondisclosures could
constitute a primary violation under Section 10(b) if the person failing
to disclose owed a duty to investors to disclose the material informa-
tion.141 The problem is that a duty-to-disclose analysis in an insider
trading case, such as Chiarella, is irrelevant to the analysis of whether
a participant in a securities offering has a duty to disclose. Chiarella
held that trading on material inside information is not a violation of
Section 10(b) unless the trader has an independent duty to disclose.14 2
Inside traders can disclose the material inside information or, alterna-
tively, they can refrain from trading. 143 Chiarella, which states a duty
in the alternative (disclose or not trade), offers no guidance in a situa-
tion that does not involve a choice between these alternative actions.
Chiarella and its progeny can be relied upon only for two general pro-
positions: (1) there is no duty to disclose absent a specific relationship
between two parties; and (2) fiduciaries owe duties to their benefi-
ciaries.'" The essential questions-to whom the duty is owed and for
what-are not answered. 145
One possibility is that the Central Bank decision will eliminate law-
yers' liability for nondisclosure claims. Some courts have articulated a
restrictive rule governing the duty of lawyers to disclose. 46 Because
lawyers can no longer be held liable in private actions for aiding and
abetting their clients' wrongdoing, if the courts decide that lawyers
have no duty to disclose, lawyers would avoid liability under Rule
10b-5 except in those instances when the lawyer has either written his
document or participated sufficiently in the drafting of other docu-
ments to be held responsible.
It is too early to tell whether courts will reconsider the duty issue.
A conclusion that courts will not impose duties to disclose on lawyers
is not consistent with courts' demonstrated willingness to hold law-
140. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
141. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446-47 (1994) (citing
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234-35). Chiarella held that an omission is actionable only
where a duty to disclose arises from the specific relationship between two parties.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227-28, 233.
142. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33.
143. See id. at 226-27.
144. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662-64 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33.
145. As Justice Frankfurter put it: "[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obliga-
tions does he owe as a fiduciary?" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
146. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir.
1986) ("When the nature of the offense is a failure to 'blow the whistle,' the defendant
must have a duty to blow the whistle. And this duty does not come from Section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5; if it did the inquiry would be circular. The duty must come from
a fiduciary relation outside securities law." (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653-64; Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-35 (1980))).
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yers' conduct liable. The policy reasons for holding lawyers liable are
still present. Securities transactions occur in group settings with the
required participation of securities professionals. When the securities
professionals actively participate in fraudulent transactions, those pro-
fessionals, including lawyers, should not be allowed to escape liability.
Claims against lawyers deter lawyer and client wrongdoing, and en-
courage lawyers to be vigilant and to practice law with competence.
The suits also compensate deceived investors. Even though the secur-
ities laws do not contemplate that lawyers, like auditors, act as watch-
dogs of their clients, lawyers should not be insulated from liability if
they participate in their clients' wrongdoing even when that wrongdo-
ing consists of deceit by the client in failing to disclose information to
the investor when the client has a duty to disclose.
In deciding nondisclosure cases before Central Bank, courts did not
need to articulate whether lawyers owed an independent duty of dis-
closure to investors. If lawyers participated in the wrongdoing and
remained silent, then courts, such as in National Student Marketing,
could proceed on the basis that the lawyer's conduct under the cir-
cumstances aided and abetted the primary violator's duty. Even
though the SEC can continue to bring actions against lawyers for aid-
ing and abetting, the courts will now be required to articulate in-
dependent duties of disclosure if the same conduct is to be held
actionable in private actions.
2. The Search for Duty
The finding of a duty in a nondisclosure case represents a court's
sense that the defendant's conduct should be considered the legal or
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. 4 7 In a misrepresentation
case, proof of the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's misrepresen-
tations is one of the elements needed to prove that the defendant
"caused" the plaintiff's injury.148 The defendant's misrepresentations
or half-truths to the plaintiff on which the plaintiff relied are the nexus
between the defendant and the plaintiff to help establish causation. In
a nondisclosure case, actual reliance is not present. Plaintiffs cannot
rely or consider the nondisclosed information in making investment
decisions when they are not aware of that information. If the nondis-
closed information is the kind of information the court determines to
have been material to the investment decision, the court presumes the
plaintiff would have relied on the information in making the invest-
ment decision. This legal presumption replaces the requirement that
the plaintiff must prove actual reliance.1 49
147. See Gabaldon, supra note 118, at 1032-50 (discussing theories and roles of
causation).
148. See Kline v. First Western Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 1994).
149. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
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The defendant's failure to perform his duty to disclose is the
"cause" of the plaintiff's injury. Duty is the nexus between the de-
fendant and the plaintiff that permits a legal conclusion that the de-
fendant can be held responsible for the plaintiff's injury. The breach
of duty is the legal or proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. As in all
legal or proximate causation issues, whether to impose a duty on the
defendant to disclose is a conclusion. To say a defendant owes a duty
is a conclusion, not an analysis of to whom the duty is owed and for
what. That analysis, explicit or implicit, is made by the court in reach-
ing its conclusion of whether the duty is owed.
Courts can search several sources of law to establish a preexisting
duty: federal common law, state common law, state statutory law,
rules of professional conduct, and SEC disciplinary proceedings in
which the Commission sets standards of practice.' 50
a. Federal Common Law
Federal courts have not traditionally examined state law in the juris-
diction where defendants committed securities laws violations to as-
certain if that jurisdiction would have imposed a duty of disclosure.
The Supreme Court in Chiarella followed prevailing common law doc-
trine that fiduciaries, or other persons who have a "relationship of
trust and confidence" with investors, owe a duty to the investors.151
150. See Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991). The Schatz court ex-
amined federal law, Maryland common law, and the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct and determined that there was no duty for the lawyer to disclose to the
investor. Id. at 490-93. The opinion was disappointing because it offered no analysis
of the particular situation in which a law firm was accused of participating in misrep-
resentations by delivering its client's fradulent financial statement to the plaintiff's
lawyer. The plaintiff alleged that because the law firm represented the defendant in
other matters, the firm must have been aware that his financial statement was
fradulent. Id. at 489. This may have been a case in which the securities laws did not
apply. The court did not address the issue of whether the note was a security. The
transaction was commercial and there is a good argument that the note was not a
security. The note was issued in connection with the sale of the plaintiff's company to
the defendant, who delivered the note as a cash substitute for the sales price of the
business. The note was guaranteed by the defendant and may have been collaterized
by the assets, although this is not clear in the opinion. The plaintiff was neither an
investor, nor a co-partner. See Futura Dev. Corp. V. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 41(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); Emisco Indus. V. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38,
40 (7th Cir. 1976); C.N.S. Enters. v. G&G Enters., 508 F.2d 1354, 1362 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). This was not the kind of transaction in which the public
reasonably expects they are dealing with a security. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494
U.S. 56, 67-70, reh'g denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990). If the note was not a security, the
plaintiff could have only recovered against the lawyers if they could have proven that
the lawyers participated in the transaction with an intent to deceive. Schatz, 943 F.2d
at 496. The standards for the lawyer's liability to a third party are dramatically differ-
ent in this transaction depending on whether the note is a security. The circumstances
do not justify this kind of distinction.
151. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-33 (1980). The Chiarella Court
refused to adopt an information parity rule that requires that all persons who had
"regular access" to nonpublic information must disclose or not trade. The Court ex-
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Dirks v. SEC52 also relied on federal common law in establishing
when an insider breaches a duty in an insider trading case.153 If courts
continue to follow the kind of analysis applied in Chiarella and Dirks,
they will initiate a federal common law inquiry into the definition of
duty in 10b-5 actions.' Because the insider trading cases are not rel-
evant to lawyers' duties in omission cases, the courts will be hard
pressed to find federal common law precedent to define lawyers' duty
to disclose to someone other than their clients in a securities violation
context. Federal common law as to lawyers' duties would have to be
created on a case-by-case basis, just as the law is being developed on
insider trading. Plaintiffs now have an incentive to push for that
development.
b. State Law
Fiduciary duties of lawyers, like fiduciary duties in general, have
always been a special province of state law. The courts may look to
state law as the source to define lawyers' duties. State law would in-
lude case law, state statutes, and state rules of professional conduct.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has signaled a retreat from creating
federal common law to fill in the interstices of federal statutory
schemes. 55 State courts, following the Supreme Court's lead, could
use state law to define the content of disclosure duty in primary viola-
plained that to adopt such a rule "departs radically from the established doctrine that
duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties." lI& at 233. The Court
relied on federal common law in recognizing that nondisclosure creates a duty to
speak only where there is a fiduciary relationship or other relationship of trust and
confidence. Id. at 229-30 (discussing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972) and other federal cases). In Dirks, the Supreme Court fashioned federal
common law in holding that it is not a fiduciary breach of duty for an insider to tip
information unless he personally will benefit from his disclosure. Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 662-64 (1983).
152. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
153. Id. at 662 (stating that "the test is whether the insider personally will benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure").
154. See id. at 653-54; Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222,234-37 (1980). The court in National
Student Marketing did not rely on the law in the jurisdiction where the lawyers were
licensed to practice to ascertain who was the client and the extent of the duties of
disclosure the lawyers owed their clients. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 682, 701-02 (D.D.C. 1978). The court simply declared that the lawyer had a
duty to disclose to his clients. See supra part H.D.1. In implying a private cause of
action under 10b-5 and in the 50 years of litigation since then, the federal courts have
not hesitated to create an extensive body of federal common law. See supra note 15
and accompanying text (stating that Rule 10(b)-5 is all federal common law).
155. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994). The FDIC, as receiver
for a failed savings and loan association, sued the association's lawyers for malpractice
and breach of fiduciary duties in connection with fraudulent real estate syndications.
The Ninth Circuit, relying on FIRREA and emphasising the need for uniformity in
this area of law, applied federal common law, rather than state law, to the state mal-
practice claims. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 751 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that state law applied. O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct.
at 2056. On remand, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court had been mis-
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tions. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court recently held that a law-
yer owed a duty of disclosure directly to the limited partners because
the lawyer was retained by the general partner who owed a fiduciary
duty to the limited partners. 156 The court applied a rule, historically
restricted to trust situations, that a lawyer "retained by a fiduciary
owes a similar duty to those with whom the client has a fiduciary rela-
tionship."' 57 The lawyer was alleged to have breached his duty to the
limited partners by failing to disclose material information in an offer-
ing circular. In the next 10b-5 action against an Ohio lawyer, plaintiffs
will rely on this case to establish in a federal district court that the
lawyer had a preexisting duty to investors.
In Twiss v. Kury,58 investors sued a brokerage firm for aiding and
abetting a Rule 10b-5 violation for failing to report to the Florida Se-
curities Commission, as required by state statute, the firm's reasons
for deciding to fire a securities sales representative. He had been fired
for defrauding investors. Subsequently, the sales representative had
moved to another firm where he defrauded the complaining investors.
The court held that although the investors could not bring an aiding
and abetting claim because of the Central Bank ruling, the investors
did have a state securities claim against the brokerage firm for failing
to comply with its statutory duty of disclosure. 59 The Florida statute
created a disclosure duty.16 0 Statutes like that one could be used as
taken, and asserted that its original opinion stood because it had applied state law.
FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19-20 (9th Cir. 1995).
Even though the O'Melveny case was dealing with a state law malpractice claim, the
Supreme Court's opinion instructs courts on when to apply state law even in extensive
federal statutory schemes such as FIRREA. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice
Scalia, citing Erie, opened the opinion with the statement: "There is no federal gen-
eral common law." Id. at 2053. In determining when to apply federal or state law in a
federal statutory scheme, the opinion began with the presumption that "matters left
unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided
by state law." Id. at 2054. The judicial creation of a federal rule is "limited to situa-
tions where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and
the use of state law.' "Id. at 2055. The Court reasoned that the need for "uniformity"
in the rules was not a sufficient federal policy interest in itself because if that were the
only justification necessary "we would be awash in 'federal common-law' rules." Id.
This emphasis on the return to Erie may portend that the Court is not willing to
make more federal common law in creating lawyers' duties under Rule 10b-5. This
conclusion would be inconsistent with the 50 years of federal common law created in
Section 10b-5 cases-the implied private remedy is an entire creature of federal com-
mon law.
156. See Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335, 1339 (Ohio 1994). But see
Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 301 (6th Cir.) (stating that under Ohio law, lawyer
had no fiduciary relationship with investors unless both parties understood that a spe-
cial trust or confidence relationship had been established), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006
(1987).
157. Arpadi, 628 N.E.2d at 1339.
158. 25 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1994).
159. Id. at 1557-58 (remanding investors' claims for further proceedings in light of
Florida law).
160. Fla. Stat. ch. 517.301(1) (1988).
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grounds for establishing a preexisting duty to disclose in Rule 10b-5
actions.
If a breach of state law duty to disclose gives rise to a duty to dis-
close under Rule 10b-5, each state will develop a different variation on
a lawyer's duty to disclose leading to the result that different lawyers
in the same transaction will have different duties depending on the
state or states in which they practice. The same difficulties result if
lawyers' duty to disclose were based on the various professional re-
sponsibility codes adopted by the states. For example, investors will
argue that a New York securities lawyer who advises an Ohio corpora-
tion owes a duty of disclosure to investors under Ohio law. The law-
yer may have no duty under New York case law and morever may be
forbidden under New York's code of professional responsibility to dis-
close the client's confidences.
c. Rules of Professional Conduct
Rules of professional conduct also could serve as a basis for defin-
ing lawyers' duties to investors. The preamble to the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") Model Rules specifically states that the Rules
"are not designed to be a basis for civil liability." 16' Most state codes
incorporate similar language, but that has not stopped courts from
looking at the ethical rules to define standards of conduct in malprac-
tice cases. Lawyers have argued that standards for civil liability can-
not be derived from professional conduct standards defined by state
codes. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, rejected an argument that an
ethical duty of disclosure under the Maryland Rules of Professional
Conduct created a corresponding legal duty under the federal securi-
ties laws. 162 The professional conduct rules could, however, serve as a
basis for establishing, under some circumstances, a special relationship
similar to a fiduciary relationship, which could form a basis for creat-
ing a duty lawyers owe to investors."6
Under all professional responsibility rules and common law, law-
yers' professional responsibilities to clients do not permit them to as-
sist their clients in conducting fraudulent activities. 1' Lawyers are
required to withdraw from the representation if their services would
161. Model Rules, supra note 2, Scope.
162. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1991).
163. See Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,495-96 (7th
Cir. 1986). In holding that the lawyers were not liable for securities laws violations,
Judge Easterbrook discussed the debate surrounding ethical duties to disclose, but
argued that an award of damages under the securities laws "is not the way to blaze the
trail toward improved ethical standards in the legal and accounting professions. Lia-
bility depends on an existing duty to disclose. The securities law therefore must lag
behind changes in ethical and fiduciary standards." Id. at 497. This argument supports
the view that ethical standards can form the basis for creating duties to investors.
164. Model Rules, supra note 2, Rule 1.16(b).
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be used to perpetuate a fraud. 165 In obvious cases of common law
fraud, this rule is easy to apply provided that the lawyer is not duped
by his client. The issue may not be as simple, however, when the with-
drawal rule is applied to violations of securities law or other regula-
tory schemes. A person commits a violation of securities laws in
making misrepresentations (or omissions) of material facts. This kind
of prohibited activity encompasses a wide range of conduct that in-
cludes fraud and conduct far less culpable than the accepted idea of
common law fraud.
The requirement of withdrawal is at once too broad and too narrow.
It is too broad if any violation of law triggers withdrawal. That inter-
pretation does not take into account that corporations are increasingly
subject to regulatory regimes that routinely authorize criminal sanc-
tions for violations. In practice, criminal sanctions are enforced only
against blatant misconduct. The withdrawal rule is too narrow if it
permits a lawyer to continue to represent an unsavory client in busi-
ness transactions where the client hovers on the line between legal
and illegal activity. The withdrawal rule, like all rules in professional
responsibility codes, states a broad principle and draws a line at the
minimum possible standard; it is not where lawyers should aim their
conduct.
Investors could argue that the failure of the lawyer to withdraw
when required constituted an implied representation that the lawyer
was not aware of any material omissions and that the duty of with-
drawal created a duty in favor of the deceived investors. This rule
would create its own set of issues. Consider first that omissions and
misrepresentations of material facts that occur because the client or
the lawyer was negligent are not violations of Rule 10b-5.16 6 The de-
fendants must have acted with scienter.167 Ex post, especially when
information has transformed from an unlikely event to an accom-
plished fact, the failure to disclose may appear to have been reckless
or intentional conduct. Moreover, disclosures under the securities
laws often require difficult judgment calls in which both lawyers and
their clients should have room to guess wrongly. It is easy to conclude
that the issuer should err on the side of disclosure but that conclusion
does not take into account that some disclosures to competitors or
others can harm the issuer's prospects, which will be detrimental to
the issuer's investors.
A disclosure duty does not necessarily serve the interests of the
public. The integrity of the securities issuance process may be under-
mined by lawyers who abandon their clients at the first hint of trouble.
Lawyers who desert too quickly their misguided but honest clients
may harm the public's interests. Most clients want to comply with
165. Id. Rule 1.16(b)(2).
166. See supra part I.A.2.
167. See id.
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disclosure laws, but want to do so in a way that does not harm per-
ceived interests of the issuer-e.g., disclosure of information useful to
competitors; premature release of information that will cause the
stock price to rise or fall; and premature release of news that hurts
employee morale. Many of these issues require difficult judgment
calls in which the experienced lawyer's judgment is vital to determin-
ing when and how to disclose in a way that fairly balances the compet-
ing interests-assisting investors in making decisions to buy and sell
the securities, and withholding information that protects the long-
term investor. Clients also have a legitimate interest in obtaining a
second opinion in difficult judgment situations. Lawyers should not
be required to protect themselves from liability by abandoning too
quickly a client that appears to be acting in good faith. At some point
the lawyer may conclude that the client is not acting in good faith and
then the lawyer should withdraw. This process and the standards that
should inform securities lawyers in the process are not set forth in
professional codes of responsibility.
The organized bar has framed the issue of securities lawyers' re-
sponsibilities to investors in simplistic terms. If the lawyer concludes
that her client's continuing conduct requires her to withdraw, the issue
in the rules becomes whether the lawyer has a duty to disclose the
fraud (common law variety) if the harm can be prevented or whether
the interest in keeping the client's secrets serves a higher purpose un-
dermined by a duty to disclose to third parties. This issue has divided
the bar within the ABA and the American Law Institute ("ALI").
States have treated the issue in a wide variety of ways in enacting their
professional responsibility codes. 16
The ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code"), adopted when National Student Marketing was filed in 1972,
permitted but did not require, a lawyer, when in possession of "infor-
mation clearly establishing" his client's fraud, to reveal the client's
fraud to the affected person or tribunal.169 By 1974, that code provi-
sion had been amended to preclude disclosure of the client's fraud
"when the information is protected as a privileged communication."'170
168. See Harris Weinstein, Client Confidences and the Rules of Professional Re-
sponsibility: Too Little Consensus and Too Much Confusion, 35 S. Tex. L Rev. 727,
733-37 (1994). The author notes that only seven jurisdictions have followed the
ABA's Model Rule on confidentiality and that at least 10 different versions of the rule
governing when a lawyer may, must, or may not disclose fraud or financial crime have
been adopted in the 50 states. Id.; see Fred C Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73
Tex. L. Rev. 335, 338-44 (1994) (providing an overview of the recent history of the
regulation of lawyers).
169. Weinstein, supra note 168, at 731.
170. Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(B)(1) (1980); see also
id. at EC 8-5 (stating that "[u]nless constrained by his obligation to preserve the confi-
dences and secrets of his client," a lawyer must reveal the fraud). A committee of
lawyers, under the auspices of the ABA, studied the issue of securities lawyers' pro-
fessional responsibilities with respect to their clients and the public. They concluded
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In protecting the attorney-client privilege and under circumstances
that appeared self-serving, the ABA had taken quick action to make it
more difficult to disclose client fraud.
In 1980, when the Kutak Commission undertook to rewrite the
ABA rules on professional responsibility, a proposed new rule would
have permitted disclosure of confidential information to prevent the
client from committing a fraudulent act. 71 The debate on the propo-
sal within the bar was intense with the trial lawyers generally opposing
any disclosure countered by many business lawyers supporting the
proposed rule. The trial lawyers prevailed with a further tightening of
disclosure rules when the current rules passed in 1983.72 The current
rule permits disclosure only when necessary to prevent substantial
bodily harm.173
The debate over these same issues continues unabated within the
American Law Institute ("ALI"). In attempting to write a Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers, the ALI has stalemated with
three different proposals ranging from permissible (but never re-
that the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility permitted, but did not require the
lawyer, to reveal the fraud. Although lawyers may reveal the fraud under circum-
stances in which the lawyer has "information clearly establishing" the fraud, "it [did]
not yet appear to have been held that a lawyer qua lawyer in a disclosure situation has
a legal obligation to make public disclosure (although lawyers have been held liable as
principals or as aiders and abettors for misstatements and omissions)." The Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities
Law Practice - A Report on the Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, 30
Bus. Law. 1289, 1295 (1975).
171. W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules,
and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. Miami L. Rev.
739 (1981). The Kutak Commission's final draft proposed rule 1.6:
A lawyer may reveal [confidential] information to the extent the lawyer
believes necessary:...
(2) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in ... substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another; [or]
(3) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in
the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used.
Id. at 807 n.242 (citing in full the text of the Kutak Commission's proposed rule 1.6);
see generally Sixth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 35 U. Miami L. Rev.
639 (1981) (symposium and articles covering the 1981 proposed Model Code and
demonstrating the controversy over the proposed code among members of the bar).
172. Model Rules, supra note 2, Rule 1.6(b). Rule 1.6(b) provides:
A lawyer may reveal such [confidential] information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
or(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a crim-
inal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any pro-
ceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
173. Id.
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quired) disclosure to prevent a death, to disclosure necessary to pre-
vent substantial financial loss.174
Those who oppose permitting lawyers to disclose client confidential
information are concerned that the rule would erode the attorney-cli-
ent privilege and clients' willingness to confide in their lawyers. This
erosion, they argue, of holding clients' confidences inviolate would se-
riously impair a client's right to a defense, especially a defense against
a government entity that could sanction lawyers for not cooperating.
Many transactional lawyers find it repugnant not to disclose when
they learn that their services were used to commit fraud. If a lawyer
learns that his services have been used to assist a completed fraud, the
lawyer, under the Model Code, can do nothing to rectify the fraud
even though he withdraws from the representation.
174. The American Law Institute appears to be at an impasse with three current
proposals, which the members did not address in their May 1995 meeting. The three
approaches are:
§ 117A. Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent Death or Serious Bodily
Injury
Following an attempt by the lawyer, if feasible, to dissuade the client, a
lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information if and to the ex-
tent the lawyer reasonably believes:
(1) The client intends to commit a crime or fraud that threatens to cause
death or serious bodily injury; and
(2) The lawyer's use or disclosure is:
(a) Reasonably appropriate to prevent the act; and
(b) Necessary in view of the imminence of the death or injury.
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 117A (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1989).
[Reporters' Proposal] 117B. Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent
Substantial Financial Loss
Following an attempt by the lawyer, if feasible, to dissuade the client, a
lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information if and to the ex-
tent the lawyer reasonably believes:
(1) The client intends to commit a crime or fraud that threatens to cause
substantial financial loss; and
(2) The lawyer's use or disclosure is:
(a) Reasonably appropriate to prevent the act; and
(b) Necessary in view of the imminence of the substantial financial
loss.
Id. (Reporters' Proposal) § 117B.
[Alternative Proposal] § 117B. Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent
Substantial Financial Loss
Following an attempt by the lawyer, if feasible, to dissuade the client, a
lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information if and to the ex-
tent the lawyer reasonably believes:
(1) The client intends to commit a crime or fraud that threatens to cause
substantial financial loss;
(2) The lawyer's services were employed in the client's course of conduct
and the loss is likely to occur if the lawyer takes no action; and
(3) The lawyer's use or disclosure is:
(a) Reasonably appropriate to prevent the act; and
(b) Necessary in view of the imminence of the substantial financial
loss.
Id. (Alternative Proposal) § 117B.
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These opposing views are probably irreconcilable because the issue
is framed in terms of irreconcilable rules and views of the issue are
based on entirely different perspectives, each of which is legitimate-
adversarial and transactional. This conflict as framed by the bar
presents one of many conundrums that could be resolved by dividing
the profession into solicitors and barristers. The legal profession in
the United States is not likely to be ready for that solution. The
twenty-year-old impasse also is evidence that the rules of professional
conduct are not likely to be relevant in determining standards under
which securities lawyers should practice. The rules are, after all, mini-
mum standards based on broad principles that are the result of com-
promise between lawyers practicing in entirely different fields. That
framework does not lend itself to the kind of thoughtful analysis to
produce a consensus on the kind of standards under which securities
lawyers should practice.
III. SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The SEC does not directly regulate the conduct of lawyers in the
way it directly regulates brokers and dealers, even though the roles
lawyers play in the regulatory system are essential. The Commission
does, however, have available a number of potential remedies to pun-
ish and deter professional misconduct. These include: civil injunctive
actions; 175 Section 15(c)(4) administrative proceedings;176 Section 8(d)
stop order proceedings; 77 and Rule 2(e)(1) administrative proceed-
ings.17 8 Since 1990, the SEC has also had the ability to enter cease and
desist orders and to impose monetary penalties. 79 The Commission
175. The SEC can enjoin any person, under § 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933
and § 21(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934, who is engaged or is about to engage in acts
or practices amounting to a violation of any provision of the Acts. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77t(b), 78(u)(d) (1994). Actions against lawyers and accountants are usually
brought under § 10 and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act and § 17 of the 1933 Act,
respectively.
176. Administrative proceedings may be brought, after a hearing, whenever there is
a need to correct a filing made. Id § 77(o)(c)(4). Additionally, the SEC can institute
a proceeding to require the making of an omitted filing. Il
177. The SEC can suspend the effectiveness of a registration statement under
§ 8(d) of the 1933 Securities Act. Id. § 77h(d).
178. Rule 2(e)(1) provides:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of
appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by
the Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i)
not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be
lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and
abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws ... or
the rules and regulations thereunder.
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1995).
179. See infra part III.B.
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also can refer cases to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecutions.
A. Rule 2(e)
Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice permits the Com-
mission to deny a lawyer the right to practice before the Commission
if the lawyer has been found "to have engaged in unethical or im-
proper professional conduct," and has been the centerpiece of SEC
enforcement actions against lawyers.' 80 Despite two recent prominent
cases brought against lawyers pursuant to other SEC proceedings,""1
Rule 2(e) has been the more important proceeding because it accom-
modates the establishment of standards of practice for securities law-
yers. The SEC historically has sought to enjoin lawyers' misconduct
on the grounds that the conduct aided and abetted the lawyers' cli-
ents' misconduct. During the 1980s, however, the SEC used Rule 2(e)
in an attempt to discipline lawyers and to define practice standards in
In re Carter.182 The case sparked immediate intense controversy
within the bar and the SEC. In Carter, the SEC brought a Rule 2(e)
proceeding against two lawyers alleging that they failed to take steps
that, in the SEC's view, were required to assure that the lawyers' cli-
ent adequately disclose its continuing financial problems.'1 3
180. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1995).
181. See In re George C. Kern, Jr. (Allied Stores Corporation), [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 84,342 (Nov. 14, 1988). The SEC authorized a
§ 15(c)(4) proceeding against George Kern, Allied Stores' principal outside counsel
and an Allied director. Naming a lawyer was an unprecedented step. The SEC staff
alleged that Allied had failed to adequately disclose information about steps being
taken to fend off a corporate takeover. Id. at 89,582. The SEC also sought an order
against Kern prohibiting any future violations of securities laws, not limited to deal-
ings with Allied. The SEC went forward with this proceeding, despite the objections
of Commissioner Fleischman, who asserted that proceedings against lawyers relating
to their legal advice to clients should be handled through outside injunctive action,
not in an SEC § 15(c)(4) proceeding. The Commission affirmed the discontinuance of
the proceeding on the ground that orders of general future compliance under 15(c)(4)
were not authorized under the 1984 Amendments thereto. Id. at 89,593-95; see also In
re Jeffrey L. Feldman, Findings and Cease and Desist Proceeding Order Pursuant to
Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1993, Securities Act Release No. 33-7014, 1993
WL 370958 (Sept. 20, 1993). The SEC obtained a consent cease-and-desist order
under § 8A of the Securities Act against a lawyer who rendered an opinion to a for-
eign bank that the sale of the bank's foreign exchange bearer certificates ("FEBC"s)
in the U.S. did not require registration. ld. at *2. The SEC charged that neither the
lawyer nor any member of his firm had "any background in the practice of law relat-
ing to the offer and sale of securities." Id Furthermore, the SEC charged that Feld-
man failed to consult authority experienced in securities-related matters and had
received notice from the Commission' staff that the FEBCs would have to be regis-
tered. Id. at *4. The description of the lawyer's conduct reads like a malpractice
claim.
182. [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
183. The client, National Telephone Company, a telephone leasing company, had
issued numerous press releases and SEC filings that were false and misleading, includ-
ing releases that failed to disclose that the company had entered into an agreement
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The Administrative Law Judge ("AU") found that the lawyers had
aided and abetted the company's primary 10b-5 violation and had en-
gaged in unethical or improper professional conduct.'" The Commis-
sion, relying on the Model Rules, reversed the ALT on the grounds
that the lawyers did not have notice of a sufficiently clear rule formu-
lated in the profession's ethical precepts. 85 At the same time, how-
ever, the Commission wrote a lengthy opinion on what steps a lawyer
must take when the client is not following his disclosure advice. Es-
sentially, the lawyer is required to go up the chain to the board of
directors or to the independent directors to urge compliance.' 8 6 In
declining to impose sanctions on the lawyers, the Commission avoided
judicial review of its authority to impose sanctions and to define law-
yers' professional conduct.
The controversy between the bar and the SEC surrounding the rul-
ing was diffused in 1982. The SEC's general counsel, Edward Greene,
stated that as a general matter, the SEC would not initiate Rule 2(e)
proceedings against a lawyer unless an Article III court had first made
a determination that the lawyer had violated the securities laws, and
there was a sufficient relational nexus between the practice of securi-
ties law and the violation.'87 Since 1982, the Commission's policy with
respect to disciplining lawyers has been to obtain first a ruling in dis-
trict court that the lawyer aided and abetted a violation of the federal
securities laws.
B. The Remedies Act of 1990
The Greene solution may soon be modified because of Congress'
grant to the SEC of enhanced enforcement powers in The Securities
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (the
"Remedies Act"). 8 The amendments to the Securities Act and the
with its creditors to institute a Lease Maintenance Program ("LMP"). Id. at 84,158-
60. The LMP required the company, once its funds were exhausted, to maintain ex-
isting leases until they expired and not to enter into new leases. The agreement was, in
effect, a liquidation plan. The lawyers repeatedly advised the CEO that he make this
disclosure and correct and revise proposed press statements. Id. at 84,161-62. The
CEO, fearing that the revelations would demoralize the employees and make failure
more probable, ignored the lawyers' advice. Id. at 84,159-60.
184. Id. at 84,165, 84,169.
185. Id. at 84,173.
186. Id. at 84,172.
187. Edward F. Greene, SEC General Counsel's Remarks on Lawyer Disciplinary
Proceedings, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 168 (Jan. 20, 1982), available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, Sec. Reg. File, at *2. The Commission confirmed this policy in 1988.
Securities Act Release No. 6,783 [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,248, at 89,244 (July 7, 1988) (stating that the Commission had not sought
to develop or to apply independent standards of professional conduct or to conduct de
novo determinations of professional conduct of lawyers).
188. The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990
(The "Remedies Act"). Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931, 933-34 (1990) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The cease and desist authority under the Remedies
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Exchange Act permit the SEC to bring administrative proceedings to
obtain cease-and-desist orders directed against any person who is
"causing" a violation of the relevant statute.1s9 Causing a violation
may prove to be a broad standard in sanctioning lawyers. Although
questions remain as to what must be shown to impose liability, "caus-
ing" liability may be easier to establish then aiding and abetting liabil-
ity. Liability may be predicated on negligence1 instead of proof of
scienter; the nexus between the acts of the person who caused the
violation and the person who committed the violation may not require
the same degree of proof as substantial assistance. Furthermore, the
SEC may have to meet a lower standard to obtain a cease and desist
order than is needed to obtain an injunction. The SEC has incentives
to use the administrative courts: These courts are efficient forums for
a group of defendants; a high percentage of ALJ decisions favor the
SEC; and the SEC's regulatory goals may be damaged if an important
case is lost.191
Act includes both permanent and temporary cease-and-desist authority. Id. at 933-41
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-3). Temporary cease and desist orders may be
entered against regulated entities and their associated persons with or without prior
notice and opportunity for a hearing. Id. This is perhaps the most controversial provi-
sion in the Remedies Act because it allows the SEC to unilaterally issue an emergency
order that temporarily restricts the activities of an entity pending the completion of
the permanent cease-and-desist order. The Remedies Act also establishes a three-tier
structure for determining the monetary penalty in a given case. Id. The selection and
applicability of a tier is based upon the level of culpability of the wrongdoer and the
potential or actual harm caused. let
189. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-3 (1994).
190. Lawyers also face potential liability for negligence pursuant to § 17(a) of the
1933 Act, the statute from which Rule 10(b)-5 was derived. See supra note 16. Sec-
tion 17(a) is directed to activities prohibited in the selling of securities while Rule
10(b)-5 is directed to activities in both selling and purchasing securities. In Aaron v.
SEq. 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Supreme Court held that in an SEC action, scienter was
an essential element of subsection (1) of Section 17(a), but was not a necessary ele-
ment of subsections (2) and (3). Id. at 695-96. The opinion suggests that a claim based
on ordinary negligence is sufficient to find a violation of the latter subsections. The
SEC could therefore pursue lawyers and others in a selling transaction based on a
negligence theory. Although the SEC has relied on Section 17(a) to enjoin lawyer
misconduct, the SEC has not brought an action against a lawyer alleging merely negli-
gent conduct. See eg., SEC v. Electronic Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 63 (D.
Conn. 1988) (relying on a theory of recklessness), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Calvo, 891
F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curium), cerL denied, 110 S. CL 3228 (1990). Section
17(a) should not play a significant role in private actions because an implied private
right of action is in doubt. The seven circuits that have considered the issue since 1982
have held that there is no implied private cause of action under § 17(a). See Finkel v.
Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1992); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines &
Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 819 (10th Cir. 1990); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F2d 935, 942-
43 (7th Cir. 1989); Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1104-07 (4th Cir. 1988); Currie
v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780,784 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc); In re Wash-
ington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 823 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Deviries
v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 805 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir. 1986).
191. See Simon M. Lome & W. Hardy Callcott Administrative Actions Against
Lawyers Before the SEC, 50 Bus. Law. 1293, 1309-12 (1995). Mr. Lome, then General
Counsel to the SEC, and Mr. Callcot argued that when the lawyer's role as lawyer is
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C. The 1995 Reform Act
Congress acted to strengthen the SEC's enforcement powers in
1990 and to limit private class actions in 1995. The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("1995 Reform Act")"9 contains sev-
eral amendments scattered throughout various sections of the Secri-
ties Act and the Exchange Act. The amendments include procedural
and substantive changes and penalties designed to thwart meritless se-
curities litigation,193 safe-harbors for those who make forward-looking
statements, 194 elimination of securities violations as a predicate for
civil liability under the RICO Act,195 proportionate liability for de-
fendants who did not commit a violation with "actual knowledge,"'196
and requirements that auditors develop procedures to detect illegal
activity and a duty to blow the whistle.197 The 1995 Reform Act also
authorizes the Commission to bring actions against "any person that
knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in viola-
tion" of the securities laws, rules, or regulations. 98
The amendments to curb meritless suits and to provide safe harbors
for forward-looking statements should not affect many suits against
lawyers. Lawyers tend to be sued in securities cases that deal with
egregious facts that should survive the stringent pleadings require-
ments of the Act. On the other hand, lawyers should benefit from
proportionate liability unless they have participated in a violation with
actual knowledge of the wrongdoing.
The SEC's ability to pursue aiding and abetting actions while pri-
vate actions are seeking to define primary liability could cause confu-
sion. The Commission will not have to prove that a lawyer has a duty
to disclose under aiding and abetting theory and the private litigant
will have to prove a duty in the omissions cases. Because SEC actions
brought in court are usually influential in establishing precedent and
in defining lawyer's responsibilities, courts in private actions may take
their cues from those decisions not to impose disclosure duties on law-
yers in omission cases. The SEC may assume a more aggresive en-
forcement policy if the 1995 Reform Act's limitations on private
actions result in significant increases in violations. The Commission is
at issue or when the case involves professional standards, the federal district court
would be the preferred forum. Id. at 1317. If the nature of the lawyer's conduct does
not raise these issues, they argue that then an administrative proceeding may be the
appropriate forum. Id
192. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 737 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (1995).
193. Id § 101, at 737-49 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
194. Id. § 102, at 749-56 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
195. Id. § 108, at 758 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
196. Id. § 201, at 758-62 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
197. Id. § 301, at 762-64 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
198. 1d. § 104, at 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(2)(f)); see supra note 57 for a
discussion on the definition of "knowingly."
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likely to bring more enforcement proceedings in administrative courts
that may not be as protective of the lawyer's role as federal district
courts have been. The effect of Central Bank and the 1995 Reform
Act has been to put a larger responsibility on the SEC's shoulders to
discipline those who participate in the securities industry. Whether
the SEC will have the ability to assume this responsibility effectively
is doubtful in the current environment of reducing government
spending.
CONCLUSION
The Central Bank decision produced changes in the liability land-
scape of Rule 10b-5. Some of those changes are for the better. Banks,
acting as indenture trustees in the sales of bonds, such as the bank
trustee in Central Bank, were never intended to bear the risks of in-
vestor protection. Investors, who ultimately bear the costs of all in-
vestor protection, should not be required to pay substantial additional
costs for the marginal benefits, if any, of oversight provided by those
kind of remote actors whose transactions are tangential to the issu-
ance of the securities. The aiding and abetting action had strayed too
far in the direction of imposing liability on these remote providers of
services. The Court's decision has the positive effect of placing
needed limitations on investors' ability to sue all possible defendants.
Those limitations, however, should have been left to Congress or to
the SEC's rulemaking authority. For example, the 1995 Reform Act's
proportionate liability provisions would have gone a long way in re-
ducing unfairness in overbroad or loose interpretations of aiding and
abetting rules. The Court's broad stroke in limiting the reach of Sec-
tion 10(b) in private actions went too far. Aiding and abetting, con-
trary to the majority's opinion, is in itself deceitful conduct in the
context of a transaction that can only be accomplished by the actions
of a group. The courts will, however, continue to sanction group con-
duct that results in defrauding investors.
As discussed in part I of this Article, the lower courts have not
needed a separate action to hold members of the core group liable as
primary violators. The lower courts, relying on common law notions
of culpability and liability of joint tortfeasors, will continue to hold the
members of the core group, whose conduct is essential to the issuance
process, liable as primary violators. This development could have se-
rious repercussions for securities lawyers. In holding lawyers liable
for misrepresentations, the courts may be more willing to find that the
issuers' disclosure documents are also those of the lawyer, thus impos-
ing even more responsibility on the lawyer. The participation test
could lead to the unfair result of rendering the lawyer a guarantor of
his client's disclosures.
Moreover, in holding lawyers liable as primary violators in nondis-
closure cases, the courts will need to define lawyers' additional duties
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owed to investors. Those newly articulated obligations to investors
may force lawyers into the untenable position of having to choose be-
tween facing liability to third parties, and disclosing their clients' con-
fidences with the risk the clients will sue the lawyers for breach of
their professional responsibility. Even in situations when the certainty
of the fraud can be recognized, the lawyer's resignation alone may not
be sufficient to avoid liability if the lawyer owes investors a duty of
disclosure. Overall, the lawyer's decision on how to deal with the cli-
ent's misrepresentations will have to be made in the setting of conflict-
ing and ambiguous information.
If lawyers' duties to third parties are developed on a case-by-case
basis, the results are likely to be unfortunate. First, the rules are not
likely to be developed in a factual setting in which the requisite
mental state has been proven because few of these cases are tried.
Courts' opinions in this area are usually written on pretrial motions.
Second, opinions are likely to be written to address egregious allega-
tions, which do not promote objectivity. In reviewing allegations of
egregious conduct, courts are not likely to address the fundamental
issue that a lawyer's role is to assist his client with disclosure without
assuming the identical risks of disclosure belonging to the client.
Third, lawyers will find themselves subject to different rules, and thus
different standards, depending on where they practice or where the
case is filed. Investors also will depend on this luck of the draw.
Fourth, the SEC has added incentive and opportunity to encourage
courts to adopt rules that benefit the agency's regulatory goals. These
rules, however, create the risks that securities lawyers may be re-
quired to perform the same kind of watchdog functions assumed now
by independent auditors. Moreover, the rules will not be subjected to
deliberation and consensus building of which a legislative-type process
is theoretically capable.
Lawyers should take the initiative to formulate thoughtful solutions
in this new environment by adopting standards of conduct that meet
reasonable expectations. In forming a group to undertake this task,
lawyers should include lay persons for a much needed perspective on
these issues.
The standards developed should promote the unique and useful
functions lawyers can serve in our society. Both society and lawyers
are disserved by rules that are perceived as predominately serving the
lawyer's interest. If the rules are fair they will promote respect for the
profession, which in turn will assist the lawyers to improve the quality
of disclosure for capital formation. If the rules are perceived as un-
fair, lawyers will lose value. In other words, rules that take into ac-
count the public's reasonable expectations are not only good for
society, but they are good for lawyers earning a living within the re-
straints of practicing a profession. Client confidentiality must yield to
the extent necessary to assure that the lawyer's services are not used
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for unlawful or unprincipled ends. To find a solution, lawyers and
others must be willing to examine the entire rationale of client confi-
dentiality and should not view the issue as a conflict between two mu-
tually exclusive solutions. Lawyers' various responsibilities will
continue to compete with each other, but they need not conflict with
each other.
The ABA's current Model Rules do not provide securities lawyers
with guidance in this area. The Model Rule on confidentiality is rigid
and perceived as self-serving. The Model Rules state general princi-
ples of minimum conduct that do not adequately assist the securities
lawyer in practicing law in today's complex environment. Moreover,
the ABA would provide a much needed service if it would produce
guidelines for securities lawyers who are practicing in an uncertain
and highly competitive environment.
The ALI's experience with drafting the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers is merely a continuation of the twenty-year-old
debate of the intense differences within the bar in which lawyers view
the issues surrounding the lawyer's duties to clients and their responsi-
bilities to society and investors. The ALI is currently at an impasse. If
the ABA and the ALI fail to address these issues, courts will fill the
void.
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